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I. Introduction
Throughout its history, the development of international law has
been influenced by the requirements of international life.
On October 27, 2010, Julian Assange and Wikileaks stunned the
world by releasing myriad documents revealing what The New York
Times termed "a critical change in the way America wages war." 2
These documents, most chronicling never-before seen details of the
war in Iraq, exposed an explosive growth in the privatization of
international, and domestic, security forces. In doing so, Assange
gave the public a glimpse into a reality that has already garnered the
attention of numerous commentators; a reality where private military
security contractors (PMSCs),' such as Blackwater (now Xe) and
MPRI, play an ever more important role in international wars,
humanitarian interventions, and even foreign aid.4 The statistics on
their prevalence are astounding: as of March 2010 there were more
than 200,000 private contractors participating in the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, in comparison to only 150,000 troops. In September
2010, the United States Department of Labor reported that, for the
first time in history, more private contractors than soldiers were killed
1. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparations Case].
2. James Glanz & Andrew W. Lehren, Use of Contractors Added to War's
Chaos in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 23, 2010, at Al.
3. This Article will use the term private military security contractors (PMSCs) to
identify those private entities engaged in military and security provision. Other
scholarship has referred to such entities as private security companies (PSCs) and
private military firms (PMFs). These acronyms should be taken as generally
synonymous for the purposes of this Article.
4. See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003); DAVID ISENBERG, SHADOW FORCE:
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ (2009); LAURA A DICKINSON,
OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF
PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011); PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC ORDER: THE
OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMITS (Simon Chesterman & Angelina
Fisher eds., 2009).
5. T. Christian Miller, This Year, Contractor Deaths Exceed Military Ones in
Iraq and Afghanistan, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/
article/this-year-contractor-deaths-exceed-military-ones-in-iraq-and-afgh-100923;
The Commission on Wartime Contracting recently suggested that the number of
private contractors in Iraqi and Afghanistan during 2010 had exceeded 260,000.
COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN,
TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (Aug.
2011) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING].
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in Iraq and Afghanistan.' Moreover, it was recently revealed that
Group4Securicor, an internationally recognized provider of private
military and security services, is the second largest employer in the
world.
Equally astounding are the accounts of abuse, violence, and
illegality that overshadow PMSC missions in locations throughout the
world. Incidents such as Nisour Square' and Abu Ghraib9 hint at the
6. Id.
7. Amada Benevides de P6rez, Chairperson of the Working Group on the Use
of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of
the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Presentation at the Human Rights
Council: 15th Session (Sept. 15, 2010) http://www.humanrightsadvocates.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/Benavides-English.doc [hereinafter Pirez Presentation].
8. On September 16, 2007, Blackwater responded to reports of a bomb
detonation in Nisour Square. A young Iraqi man driving through the area, unaware
that a bomb exploded, was approached by four Blackwater Security vans.
Blackwater employees began to shoot indiscriminately, killing the young man, his
mother who was also in the car with him, and fifteen other Iraqi civilians. According
to the FBI, at least fourteen of the shootings were unjustified. See James Glanz &
Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths, N.Y.TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2007, at Al. Initial charges against the employees were dismissed; however,
on April 22, 2011 a federal appeals court reopened the criminal case against four of
the American military contractors. See James Risen, Ex-Blackwater Guards Face
Renewed Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,2011, at A6.
9. A classified report regarding actions taken against prisoners at Abu Ghraib
revealed accounts of illegal activities, torture, and abuse. Specific acts of abuse
included "punching, slapping and kicking detainees; videotaping nude male and
female detainees; forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions
for photographing; forcing nude male detainees to wear women's underwear; forcing
groups of male detainees to masturbate while being photographed and videotaped;
arranging nude male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them; and positioning a
nude detainee on a box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture." Private contractors from both
CACI and Titan, acting as interrogators and interpreters, were implicated in the
scandal. The report also noted that the contractors had easy and unsupervised access
to the section of the prison where the detainees were being held and were often
indistinguishable from the detainees themselves because they did not wear uniforms.
Although American soldiers were eventually prosecuted for their actions, none of the
contractors were ever held legally accountable. See ISENBERG, supra note 4, at 113.
See also Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing War from
the Perspective of International and Human Rights Law, 13(2) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 315, 335 (2006). Two recent lawsuits against CACI and L-3 Communications
Holdings, which alleged that the companies conspired with the government to cover
up the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, were recently dismissed by the Fourth
Circuit due to federal preemption. See Travis Sanford, Detainees Lose Bid to Sue
Abu Ghraib Contractors, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVS. (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://www.courthousenews.com/ 2011/10/05/40328.htm. See also, Al-Shimari v.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., No. 09-1335, 2001 WL 4382081 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011)
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impunity with which PMSCs operate, and raise serious concerns as to
the ability, or willingness, of our current legal systems to regulate
these private actors. Indeed, a careful review of existing domestic
and international legal structures suggests that PMSCs exist largely
outside the purview of the law - a recent delegation from the UN
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries found PMSCs involved in
summary executions, acts of torture, arbitrary detention, trafficking of
persons, serious health damages to local populations, sexual abuse of
minors, and trafficking of weapons.o
Highlighting this "[a]ccountability gap," as it is termed here, is
not a novel enterprise." Beginning at the turn of the twenty-first
century, and continuing to this day, a multitude of theorists,
journalists, and politicians have sought to expose the means by which
these problematic modern military entities are able to act with such
widespread indifference and blatant disregard for human rights
obligations. Yet despite these inquiries, and the subsequent
profusion of political and legal "remedies" that followed, almost a
decade later PMSCs continue to act with the same, if not more,
defiance. Clearly, efforts at rectifying this problem have missed the
mark. While there is no shortage of academic expositions on why
prior efforts have failed, almost all address the issue on a micro level,
considering the ways in which certain laws or State approaches are
inadequate.12 These debates are seemingly endless and, to at least
and Al Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011).
10. Perez Presentation, supra note 7, at 2.
11. See, e.g., John S. Kemp, Note, Private Military Firms and Responses to Their
Accountability Gap, 32 WASH U. J. L. & POL'Y 489 (2010); SINGER, supra note 4;
Christopher J. Mandernach, Warriors without Law: Embracing a Spectrum of Status
for Military Actors, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 137 (2007); Jon D. Michaels, Beyond
Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with
Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1001 (2004); and Steven L. Schooner, Contractor
Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced
Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 549 (2005).
12. See Kemp, supra note 11 (discussing failed United States domestic legal
efforts to "remedy" the problem of contractor accountability in light of the Nisour
Square incident); E.L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private
Security Industry and its Implications for International Humanitarian Law
Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (2008) (focusing on contractor accountability
within the regime of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)); Jackson Nyamuya
Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy, Private Military Companies & International Law:
Building New Ladders of Legal Accountability & Responsibility, 11 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESO. 99 (2009) (considering the doctrine of command responsibility as a
means of states holding PMSCs accountable); Kevin H. Govern & Eric C. Bales,
Taking Shots at Private Military Firms: International Law Misses its Mark (Again), 32
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one author, ultimately futile." What is undeniable is the reality that
few of these efforts have opened the door towards greater
accountability, and none have considered the necessity of holding
PMSCs directly accountable for their actions.
In contrast, this Article proposes that it is not just the current
solutions themselves that are inadequate, but also the larger
framework within which they are situated. Recent legal efforts to
address the impunity of PMSCs (the [aiccountability gap) have been
unsuccessful because they fail to consider and reflect the larger
transformations taking place in international relations. This is, in
essence, what shall be referred to as the larger [Aiccountability gap,
within which particular manifestations of discordance are exhibited.14
It is grounded in the notion international law no longer accurately
reflects the nature of the realities it is meant to regulate, allowing
those actors which now hold power in global politics, yet are
unrecognized by international law, to escape accountability. Efforts
to regulate these actors must address their growing importance within
global society and accord them the legal status necessary to reflect
such power.
In conjunction with this observation, this Article proposes a
remedy to the [a]ccountability gap for PMSCs that is grounded in
addressing and narrowing the larger [A]ccountability problem. It
suggests a normative framework for the extension of human rights
obligations to PMSCs. This solution has both practical and symbolic
implications; it improves accountability for PMSCs and provides an
example of how the articulation of new legal norms can lessen the gap
between international relations and international law. The
framework can be established by expanding the existing rigid
concepts of "legal personality" under international law to consider
non-state actors, specifically PMSCs, when they are engaging in
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 55 (2008-09) (discussing the application of laws regarding
mercenaries on PMSCs); and Tina Garmon, Note, Domesticating International
Corporate Responsibility: Holding Private Military Forms Accountable Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325 (2003).
13. See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors in
Conflict Situations 66 (663) INT'L REV. RED CROSS 491 (2006).
14. 1 use [a]ccountability gap and [A]ccountability gap terminology in this Article
in order to easily distinguish between the two issues that will be discussed. These are
terms that have been developed for purposes of this Article, although they are
grounded in the general notion of an "accountability gap" that has been extensively
discussed by others.
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actions that are fundamentally the province of the state. In addition,
it can be carefully bounded, so as to avoid concerns that it might
expand beyond current realities, to recognize only those obligations
that reflect a careful balancing of individual rights and legitimate
military interests - a consideration already thoroughly considered in
existing jurisprudence - and to incorporate only those claims that are
sufficiently connected to the actions of the PMSC via the theoretical
"all-subjected" principle of international justice.
In presenting a persuasive argument for the consideration of this
framework, this Article will proceed in five parts. Part II will provide
context on the development of PMSCs and further illustrate the often
disastrous consequences of their unbridled authority as a means of
conveying both their important, and growing, role in society. Part III
will present this [a]ccountability gap as a consequence of the larger
disparities between international relations and international law. It
suggests that current domestic and international efforts to regulate
PMSCs are rendered ineffective by the limited statist orientations
within which they operate. It will further argue that any truly
effective remedy for PMSC atrocities must reflect the legal and
political prominence that PMSCs hold within current military
structures. Part IV will then present an argument for a new
normative framework for addressing PMSCs within international law
as a means of better reflecting their powerful role in international
relations. It will explain in more detail the means by which PMSCs
can be accorded a form of limited legal personality in order to
facilitate the imposition of human rights obligations. Part IV will
further illustrate how this limited legal personality can be carefully
conceptualized and constrained, using existing jurisprudence and
justiciable theories, to provide a realistic means for addressing
PMSCs while at the same time improving the alignment between
international relations and international law. The Article will close
by acknowledging and reflecting on likely practical concerns and will
suggest that even in the absence of established institutions for
regulation and enforcement, a proposal for new normative ideals
represents an important step in remedying both the practical and
theoretical accountability gaps identified here.
34 [Vol. 35:1
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II. Considering Private Military Security Firms
In order to provide context for the discussions to follow, this
section will consider the rise of PMSCs" and the consequences of
their growing role as unregulated military actors. It will begin by
providing a brief historical background on the establishment of
PMSCs and their development as the primary operatives in the world
of national security. It will then consider the increasingly negative
ramifications of this shift towards private military action, including
the numerous incidents of violence, corruption, and general unrest to
which PMSCs have been linked by reporters, governments, and the
disclosure of the Wikileaks materials. As will be seen, the prominent
role of PMSCs within international society, and their importance in
military operations, is unlikely to lessen. With that realization, it is
clear that their significant influence must be regulated.
A. The Rise of Private Military Security Firms
Beginning with the seminal work of Peter Singer in Corporate
Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, the growth and
development of PMSCs has been discussed in exhaustive detail, and
has resulted in numerous commentaries on the regulatory lacuna
within which they operate.16 Because the familiar concept of a private
15. The question of how to define a PMSC is a continually contested one.
Although PMSCs have at times been divided into varying forms based on the services
they provide, this Article will consider them more generally, acknowledging that the
roles they take on are increasingly broad and intertwined. Prior authors have utilized
a wide variety of categorizations for PMSCs. These include military provider firms,
military support firms, and military consulting firms. Military provider firms focus
primarily on the tactical environment. They "carry out highly coordinated battlefield
maneuvers . . . to assist in or accomplish military objectives." Military support firms
provide less direct support services including logistics, technical, and intelligence
support. Military consulting firms primarily train police and military forces.
Although these are arguably distinct categories of PMSCs, I will utilize the broad
definition of PMSC pioneer Peter Singer: "Private military firms are business
organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare. They
are corporate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills, including
combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational
support training, and technical skills." SINGER, supra note 4, at 8.
16. See generally SINGER, supra note 4; DICKINSON, supra note 4; Doug Brooks &
Jim Shevlin, Reconsidering Battlefield Contractors, 6 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 103 (2005);
Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International
Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 75 (1998); JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S
MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY (2007); ISENBERG, supra note 4; and FROM
MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY
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military force has been the subject of many a skillful historical
appraisal, this Article will not attempt to reexamine the historical
roots of PMSCs at length." It will, however, provide a brief overview
of their rise to predominance.
As Singer suggests, "the foreign soldier hired for pay, the
mercenary, is an almost ubiquitous type in the entire social and
political history of organized warfare."" For much of early history,
until the seventeenth century, it was not uncommon for foreigners to
make themselves available, both as individuals and as organized
companies, to fight in conflict for whoever was able to bid the highest
for their services. Known as mercenaries, these individuals were the
first form of privatized warfare and played a significant role in many
historical conflicts, including the Hundred Years War, Napoleonic
War, and Thirty Years War.20 With improvements in technology,
however, came the introduction of warfare on a more massive scale,
displacing mercenaries with quickly trained mass forces that could be
more cheaply and readily armed. 2' This decline was further
emphasized by post-World War II practices that introduced, and then
emphasized, the role of the nation state and national armies, reducing
the appeal of privatized warfare. 2   Eventually, as a result of
controversial post-colonial struggles for independence, many called
for investigation into the human rights abuses and war crimes
committed at the hands of these "hired" individuals, often labeling
mercenaries as criminals.23
Despite these well-founded concerns, private military forces rose
again in the wake of the Cold War as rapid shifts in geopolitical
power and neoliberal agendas created powerful incentives for
COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnard eds., 2007).
17. For the initial, and perhaps most thorough, documentation of the rise of
PMSCs, see SINGER, supra note 4.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 19.
20. See Singer's expansive discussion of the history of private military forces from
ancient history until the seventeenth century. He argues, amongst other things, that
private military actors played a central role in conflict for much of our early history,
including that "the majority of the bloody battles of the Hundred Years War were
decided by [private actors]." SINGER, supra note 4, at 25.
21. For a more exhaustive detailing of the role of mercenaries in the seventeenth
to nineteenth centuries, see SINGER, supra note 4.
22. Govern & Eric C. Bales, supra note 12, at 60-61.
23. Gaston, supra note 12, at 231.
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privatization and deregulation. 24  As the focus on free economic
enterprise led to significant downsizing in the military forces of
Western powers,25 and renewed reliance on the marketplace to fulfill
"public needs,"26 PMSCs emerged reconstituted as private firms
poised to become the "next evolution in the provision of military
services by private actors, parallel to the development of the modern
business organization.",27 In these periods of transition, governments
found that privatized forces offered significant advantages. They
drew from the surplus of military personnel no longer employed by
the state, which greatly reduced the need for extensive training.
Privatized forces were also believed to be more efficient; given the
volatile fluctuations in demand that characterized modern
international warfare, many thought it better to draw from a group of
temporary, well-trained forces in times of conflict rather than depend
on a permanent standing army that "drained resources in times of
peace."a As they developed into more formal corporate
arrangements, PMSCs were able to provide services across a wide
range, from consulting to direct participation in armed conflict.29
They quickly developed into institutions established to facilitate and
conduct war for the purposes of profit.30
24. BENEDICT SHEEHY ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRIVATE MILITARY
CORPORATION 13 (2009). See generally Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The
Rise of Outsourcing in Modem Warfare: Sovereign Power, Private Military Actors,
and the Constitutive Process, 60 ME. L. REv. 429 (2008); Walter Mattli & Ngaire
Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics, in THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
25. Within three years of the end of the Cold War, the worldwide military force
shrank by seven million. SINGER, supra note 4, at 13.
26. Kemp, supra note 11, at 496.
27. SINGER, supra note 4, at 45.
28. ISENBERG, supra note 4, at n.53.
29. SINGER, supra note 4, at 20. As Nagan and Hammer note, this process was
occasionally plagued by concerns about the breadth of its impact and questions of
how far it could be extended without intruding upon the inherent functions of the
State. Although these concerns would prove predictive of later conversations and
larger philosophical objections, they were overshadowed here by the appeals of
neoliberalism. See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 24, at 434.
30. SHEEHY, supra note 24, at 3. Indeed, the profit margin for PMSCs is
impressive. Recently released Department of State cables indicate that escorting a
single executive within Iraq for "a four-hour roundtrip from COB Basrah to South
Oil Company" costs around $6,000 per trip. Michael Bush, Wikileaks XXV: Security
Firms in Iraq Making a Killing (Figuratively in This Case), INST. FOR POL'Y STUD.
(Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.fpif.org/blog/wikileaks-xxv_security-firms-in-iraq-
making-akilling-figurativelyin-this-case.htm.
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Although not explicitly recognized as such at the time, the
growth of PMSCs was coterminous with the devolution of the state
monopoly over warfare. African and Balkan states facing
reorganization and destabilization sought the presence of PMSCs to
bring renewed order and stability through their highly skilled and
well-resourced employees," while, at the same time, many Western
states found PMSCs an increasingly attractive option for their covert
participation in foreign conflicts that lacked domestic political
support.32 Defense department contracts with PMSCs allowed for the
indirect participation of the United States in the Colombian drug war,
the Balkan war, and a myriad of other conflicts for which Congress
was not otherwise willing to risk political support in order to fund.33
Between 1994 and 2002, "the Defense Department entered into more
than 3,000 contracts with United States based firms."34
Currently, the size of the PMSF industry is valued at more than
$200 billion annually." The Department of Defense (DoD) now
employs around 170,000 military contractors on a yearly basis, having
more than doubled its use of contracting services since 2001.36 As
31. By the end of the twentieth century, PMSCs had already played a significant
role in conflicts in Colombia, Eritrea, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Papua New Guinea, amongst others.
32. As Martha Minow discusses, this intent is of itself problematic. If PMSCs are
hired in order to avoid the political costs of conflict, we risk an eroded state
responsibility for the conduct of war making and more generally weakened
international law compliance. See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How
Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and
Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2004-05).
33. Kemp, supra note 11, at 497. Although not discussed in great detail here,
several scholars have raised the concern that this use of PMSCs makes them
inherently antidemocratic institutions, as they are used when a government cannot
gather the support it needs through traditional democratic processes or wishes to
evade public scrutiny. See SHEEHY, supra note 24, at 4.
34. Kateryna Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the
Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and
Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 365, 371 (2006).
35. Sam Perlo-Freeman and Elisabeth Skons, The Private Military Services
Industry, SIPRI INSIGHTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY, No. 2008/1 (Sept. 2008). Within
the DOD alone, the amount obligated on service contracts to private contractors is
expected to exceed $206 billion by the end of fiscal year 2011. See UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: FURTHER ACTION NEEDED TO BETTER
IMPLEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR CONDUCTING INVENTORY OF SERVICE CONTRACT
ACTIVITIES 13 (GAO-11-192 2011); COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, supra
note 5, at 2.
36. Elke Krahmann, The New Model Soldier and Civil-Military Relations, in
[Vol. 35:138
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Singer suggests:
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the majority of states in the
world are either combining into larger regional communities or
falling apart internally . . . the outcome is the striking weakness of
the majority of states in the present world system. Most are so
feebled as to be incapable of carrying out their most basic
functions. Many states are less willing and less able to guarantee
their own sovereign autonomy. Instead, they are increasingly
delegating the task of securing the life and property of their citizens
to other organizations.3 '
Given such reliance, it is unlikely that the role of PMSCs will
decrease in the foreseeable future. As the purposes of warfare
continue to shift away from rapid battlefield results and towards
establishing conditions under which political development can occur,
military needs will continue to grow more complex and protracted."
This necessitates the continued engagement of private contractors at
all aspects of operation, from warfare to the construction of large
base camps.40 As the Center for New American Security has
suggested, "absent a significant reduction in America's international
commitment and perceived global interests, the employment of
private contractors in future American conflicts is here to stay."41
PMSCs have situated themselves as a powerful, and formidable,
group of actors within modern international warfare.42
PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES 247, 254 (Andrew Alexandra et al.
eds., 2008). See also UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, supra note 35, at 1.
37. SINGER, supra note 4, at 55-56.
38. Although the examples here focus primarily on the United States, as one of
the largest purveyors of private military services, this level of dependence is evident
in other countries throughout the world. For instance, the United Kingdom has
contracted out PMSCs for operation and maintenance of its nuclear submarines,
aircraft support units, tank transporter unites, and airtanker refueling fleet.
Additionally, Australia and Canada have privatized significant portions of their
military services, including military recruiting in Australia and electronic warfare in
Canada. Amol Mehra, Bridging Accountability Gaps - The Proliferation of Private
Military and Security Companies and Ensuring Accountability for Human Rights
Violations, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 323, 324 (2009-10).
39. RICHARD FONTAINE & JOHN NAGL, CONTRACTING IN CONFLICTS: THE PATH
To REFORM, CENTER FOR A NEw AMERICAN SECURITY 15 (June 2010),
http://www.cnas.org/node/4560 [hereinafter CONTRACTING IN CONFLICTS].
40. Id. at 14.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Internationally, PMSCs have, or are currently, operating in: Africa (Angola,
Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan Algeria, Kenya, and Uganda); Europe (Croatia, Bosnia,
2012]1 39
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B. The Unforeseen Consequences
Given their expansive presence on the global political stage, it is
no surprise that PMSCs have come under great scrutiny for the litany
of illegal actions in which they have participated. In a series of
incidents, the most infamous of which may be the Nisour Square
event in Baghdad in 2007,43 companies such as Blackwater have been
increasingly criticized for actions seen as reckless, negligent, and
sometimes deadly. In addition to allegations of excessive or
dangerous force like that see in Nisour Square, PMSCs have also
been exposed for participating in a variety of human rights abuses
both directly related, and tangential, to their military and security
roles." In 2002, it was discovered that employees of DynCorp, who
were assisting the United States in the Balkan Wars, were buying and
trading young women and girls.45 In 2004, it was revealed that
employees of CACI International and Titan were employed as
interrogators at Abu Ghraib and involved in the prison abuses that
occurred there. A few months later, private videos released over the
Internet revealed Aegis contractors on patrol in Iraq apparently
arbitrarily shooting at Iraqi civilians.46
Despite such atrocities, few of the PMSCs, or the employees
involved in these abuses, have ever been held criminally, or civilly
liable for their actions, often due to systematic political efforts to
Kosovo); the former Soviet Union (Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan);
the Middle East (Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq); Asia (Papua New
Guinea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Burma, Philippines, Indonesia); and the Americas
(Columbia, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, United States). SINGER, supra note 4, at 17.
43. For more information on this incident, see supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
44. In addition to the more prominent examples listed above, David Isenberg has
catalogued numerous violations of a lesser degree. These include: a March 2005
memo from Blackwater suggesting that "actually it is 'fun' to shoot some people"; the
killing of Iraqi civilians for unknown reasons in western Baghdad in January 2005, in
Kirkuk in February 2006, in Baghdad in March 2006, December 2006, February 2007
and May 2007, and in Kurdistan in October 2007; and the release of a "trophy" video
in fall 2005 which showed security guards in Baghdad randomly shooting Iraqi
civilians. More can be found in ISENBERG, supra note 4, at 137.
45. Robert Capps, Outside the law, SALON.COM (June 26, 2007), http://www.
salon.com/2002/06/26/bosnia_4/.
46. See Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contract Workers Implicated in February
Army Report on Prison Abuse Remain on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004 at A6;
Sean Rayment, 'Trophy' Video Exposes Private Security Contractors Shooting Up
Iraqi Drivers, THE TELEGRAPH, Nov 26, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1504161/Trophy-video-exposes-private-security-
contractors-shooting-up-Iraqi-drivers.html.
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confer immunity.47 Of the hundreds of thousands of PMSC
contractors that have worked for the United States since 2001, few
have ever been prosecuted. 48  At an organizational level, the only
repercussions PMSC firms have faced are the infrequent financial
losses suffered as a result of terminated contracts.49  Even these,
however, seem unpersuasive given that almost all PMSCs retain the
right to seek out new contracts and business elsewhere, often within a
different government department.0 The Project on Government
47. For example, in Iraq, Order 17, issued in June 2004 by the Administrator of
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), declared contractors immune from
prosecution during the three years of the CPA. Similarly, any abuses committed by
United States military personnel and private contractors working under Plan
Columbia cannot be investigated or prosecuted. In addition, per an agreement
between Columbia and the United States, Columbia is forbidden from submitting
any United States armed forces personnel or United States private contractors who
have committed crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court. See
Jos6 L. Gomez del Prado, Privatising security and war, 37 FORCED MIGRATION REV.
18, 19 (Mar. 2011). Recently Iraqi political leaders suggested that United States
individuals remaining in Iraq after United States withdrawal would not be granted
immunity under Iraqi law. This assertion has drawn criticism from the United States
and it remains to be seen whether it will be eliminated during further negotiations.
See Tim Arango & Michael S. Schmidt, Iraqi Denies Legal Immunity to U.S. Troops
After 2011, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/
middleeast/iraqis-say-no-to-immunity-for-remaining-american-troops.html.
48. In February 2007, former CIA contractor David Passaro was convicted in
United States courts for beating an Afghan prisoner to death. See Andrea Weigl,
Passaro Will Serve 8 Years for Beating, NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 14, 2007, at B1. In
July 2008, contractor Simon Mann was sentenced to thirty-four years in prison for his
role in an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea. David Pallister, Simon Mann gets 34
years in Equatorial Guinea Jail, THE GUARDIAN, July 7, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/07/equatorialguinea. Seventeen national
contractors have also been prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act since March 2005. See CONTRACTING IN CONFLICTS, supra note 39, at 25.
49. For example, in 2009, the United States Embassy in Kabul announced it
would not renew its contract with ArmorGroup after reports of sexual misconduct.
However, such a decision did not preclude ArmorGroup from seeking out contracts
with other entities, or even from seeking contracts with the United States
government outside of Afghanistan. See Ed O'Keefe, Controversial Security Firm
Loses Kabul Contract, WASH. PosT (Dec. 8, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
federal-eye/2009/12 controversial securityjirmlo.html.
50. One response to the problem of PMSCs, which has been considered at great
length and discarded by most, is the market incentive for PMSCs to comply with
international and national law. Several works from the late 1990s and early 2000s
argued that PMSCs would studiously avoid egregious action in order to continue to
receive defense contracts. As Tim Spicer argued, "Given that the PMC is a business,
it is acknowledged that a fundamental law of successful business is that the supplier is
only as good as his last contract." In recent years this has been proven overtly wrong
and PMSCs continue to subvert these time-tested economic principles by retaining,
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Accountability (POGO) recently reported that of 1,041 misconduct
instances since 1995 in POGO's Contractor Management Database,
there have been only two convictions of PMSC firms, fifty guilty
pleas, and 105 adverse civil judgments."
Two recent incidents serve to illustrate the extent of PMSCs'
illicit actions. On August 17, 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai
took drastic action against what he perceived to be a major concern
for his country, the fact that "private security companies are
increasingly becoming more like private militias with no one
enforcing any control over them."5 2 He issued a law banning all fifty-
two PMSCs from the country in an effort to address reports that
many were involved in robbery, kidnapping, and misuse of their
authority, including the hiring of violent drug users as military
trainers and the decision to supply "sidearms for everyone" despite
most employees being unauthorized to use weapons." Although this
proclamation was later tempered by President Karzai's decision to
gradually transition from PMSCs to an Afghan Public Protection
Force, due to logistical concerns, Karzai remains committed to
disbandment of PMSCs linked to government corruption and the
eventual elimination of a foreign private military presence.54 Not long
and gaining, contracts despite violent and illegal behavior. TIM SPICER, AN
UNORTHODOX SOLDIER: PEACE AND WAR AND THE SANDLINE AFFAIR 25-26 (1999).
51. Neil Gordon, Solution: How the Government Can Stop Doing Business with
Risky Contractors, PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.
pogo.org/pogo-files/alerts/contract-oversight/co-fcmd-20110303.html.
52. Lama Hasan, President Karzai Orders Foreign Security Out, ABC NEWS,
Aug. 17, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/president-karzai-orders-foreign-
security-afghanistan/story?id=11418609.
53. Id. On January 23, 2011 the Washington Post obtained a copy of official
charges alleged by the Afghan government against PMSCs, including claims of
"major offences" by sixteen security firms. Among those firms listed as major
offenders are Triple Canopy, G4S, Global Strategies Group, Control Risks and
Aegis. See Joshua Partlow & Rajiv Chandraskekaran, Security firms are accused of
breaking Afghan laws, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2011, at A15. In March 2011, the DOD
released a report indicating that the number of PMSCs in Afghanistan had hit a
record high and more than tripled since June 2009. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S USE OF
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND,
ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS (2011).
54. See MARK CHECCHIA, PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES GIVE WAY TO THE
AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE (Oct. 2011). Beginning in July 2011, Karzai has
initiated a planned transfer of power to the Afghan National Security Forces. It is
hoped that they, and the newly created Afghan Public Protection Force, will take full
control of the country's security operations by 2014.
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after this revelation, the October 2010 Wikileaks document release
revealed that the problems and concerns leading to President Karzai's
decision were not confined to Afghanistan alone. Culled from the
over 300,000 documents that Wikileaks released, reporters and
researchers found a multitude of incidents where, as The New York
Times described it, "a failure to enforce rules of engagement that bind
the military, endangered civilians as well as the contractors
themselves."5
Perhaps most striking were the number of circumstances, most
never made public, where PMSC employees were found to have
participated in shootings and deaths for reasons that were plainly
unjustified. For instance, in 2006 contractors with the PMSC Danubia
Global killed three Iraqis and then refused to provide any
information or answer any questions with regard to the issue.' In
2007, a convoy operated by Unity Resources Group wounded a
bodyguard for President Jalal Talabani of Iraq and failed to report
the shooting." In 2009, PMSC contractors were found to have driven
into a neighborhood in Erbil shooting indiscriminately and wounding
three women. The company report, never made public, reported
that "this drunken group of individuals were out having a good time
and firing their weapons."59 And lest such incidents be confined to
the unbridled use of force, subsequent Wikileaks documents released
in December 2010 revealed that Dynacorp was yet again involved in
child prostitution, implicated in the participation of the practice of
"bacha boys," which involves selling boys between eight and fifteen
years old to the highest bidder. These examples are only a sampling
of the horrific acts that were uncovered. What is clear is that PMSCs
continue to engage in behavior in blatant violation of military codes
of conduct and international law.
For over two decades PMSCs have acted with relative impunity,
engaging in acts of violence and committing human rights abuses
55. James Glanz & Andrew W. Lehren, Use of Contractors Added to War's
Chaos in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/
middleeast/24contractors.html?pagewanted=all.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. James Linkins, Wikileaks Reveals That Military Contractors Have Not Lost
Their Tast for Child Prostitutes, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/08/wikileaks-reveals-that-mi n-793816.html.
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most would find abhorrent. And yet, as Spencer Ackerman has
suggested, "you can shoot people, run guns, and still win big
government contracts."" Such pronouncements raise the question,
why are PMSCs allowed to act in such an unrestrained fashion? As
Part III will show, this Article argues that the most significant
problem lies not with the laws and policies themselves, but with the
underlying dissonance between international relations and
international law that leaves international mechanisms for protection
increasingly unable to accommodate the changing geopolitical
trajectory towards privatization.
III. Incompatible Realities: The Increasingly Divergent
Trajectories of International Relations and International
Law
Recent decades have witnessed a growing misalignment, from local
levels to the global, between the scope and impact of economic
forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their
adverse consequences. These misalignments create the permissive
environment within which blameworthy acts by business
enterprises may occur without adequate sanctioning or reparation.
Their human rights consequence, and their adverse impact on the
sustainability of markets and enterprises themselves, have become
major concerns.
- John Ruggie, UN Special Representative on Business and
Human Rights62
Previous analytical efforts to address the [a]ccountability gap
present in the regulation of PMSCs have presented a wide range of
justifications for their continued impunity. As Surabhi Ranganathan
suggests, "often capacity, responsibility, and interest do not
coalesce."" Developing countries frequently lack the resources and
infrastructure necessary to effectively regulate PMSCs, while
authoritarian regimes, as has been seen in the case of Libya, employ
61. Spencer Ackerman, You Can Shoot People, Run Guns, and Still Win Big
Gov't Contracts, WIRED.COM (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2010/10/you-can-shoot-people-take-drugs-and-still-win-big-govt-contracts/.
62. John Ruggie, Opening Remarks, Trygve Lie Symposium on Fundamental
Freedoms (Sept. 24, 2010).
63. Surabhi Ranganathan, Constructing Governance, but Constructive
Governance? The Emergence and Limitations of a Dominant Discourse on the
Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies (Asian Soc'y Int'l Law,
Working Paper No. 2008/9, 2009).
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PMSCs with, at best, little interest in regulation, or, at worst, an
expressly illegal motive." Similarly, regulation in Western countries
is arguably besieged by the pressure of political interests, economic
dependency, and neoliberal beliefs that the market can best
accommodate PMSC violations. All of these explanations, while
situationally important, fail to account for the fundamental problem
that has been brewing within the international sphere for several
decades: the increasingly broad divide between the subjects5
perceived to be foundational to international relations, and the
system of regulation meant to govern interactions between these
subjects, international law.
The function of international law is to provide a legal basis for
the orderly management of international relations. 6 Historically, that
law has aligned itself with a system of relations focused exclusively on
the state. While, in recent decades, that system has begun to change,
international law has not. As this section will reveal, this theoretical,
and practical, [A]ccountability gap is created due to a rigidity within
international law of which the impunity of PMSCs is symptomatic.
By understanding the [A]ccountability gap that continues to plague
the domain of international law more broadly, we can better address
the [a]ccountability gaps denotative of this larger issue. As Anne-
Marie Slaughter has suggested, "explicating the connections between
the two disciplines [international law and international relations] may
64. Although not hiring explicitly through PMSC firms, Libyan dictator
Muammar Qaddafi hired private soldiers, believed to be former rebels from Darfur,
Chad, and Niger, to fight local uprisings, including the recent rebellion, in an entirely
unregulated fashion. Although such a situation may be too extreme for most PMSCs
to readily participate, PMSCs have clearly participated in controversial activities, like
interrogations at Abu Ghraib, at the behest of local governments. See Stayton
Bonner, How Much Does it Cost to Hire an African Mercenary?, SLATE.COM (Feb.
23, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/explainer/2011/02/how
much does it costtohireanafrican-mercenary.html.
65. Within international law, the "subject" may be defined as "persons to whom
international law attributes rights and duties directly and not through the medium of
their states." See Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality
of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 535 (1956).
66. Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and Liability for International
Human Rights Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges, 6 Nw. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 222 (2008).
67. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANS'L L. 485, 487 (2005) (describing a legal universe with two guiding
principles: "first, law was deemed to reside only in the acts of official, state-
sanctioned entities. Second, law was seen as an exclusive function of state
sovereignty.").
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make international lawyers more aware of the extent to which deeply
entrenched international legal rules and principles reflect outmoded
or discredited assumptions about the international system." 68  In
order to understand the construction of this gap, we must begin where
many would argue the framework for an international system began:
the development of the Westphalian order.69
A. The State as Sovereign
The first era of international relations and international law, as it
might be categorized, is undoubtedly defined by the notion of the
state as the primary international actor."o Beginning with the series of
treaties signed at the end of the Thirty Years War, termed the Peace
of Westphalia, the Westphalian political order was developed in
earnest, focusing on the sovereign state and ensuring that the
predominate structures of international relations (IR) focused on
relations between such states." This structure, what IR theorists term
the "realist" approach, recognized the inherent power that lay within
the national government, making domestic control of a territorial
entity the most significant factor in establishing sovereign legitimacy
and recognition within the international order.72 In such a reality, the
state was granted the power to exercise exclusive control, without
68. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations theory:
A Prospectus, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION 16, 19-20 (Eyal Benevisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004).
69. Some political theorists and historians contest the narrative of Westphalian
dominance, arguing that the idea has never taken hold as forcefully as many would
like to believe. In response to this criticism, I defer to the wisdom of Nancy Fraser in
responding to a similar concern within her scholarship, "In my view, however, the
great majority of anti-colonialists in the post-World War II era sought to achieve
independent Westphalian states of their own. In contrast, only a small minority
consistently championed justice within a global frame .. . My claim, then, is that, far
from contesting the Westphalian frame per se, anti-imperialists forces generally
sought rather to realize it in a genuinely universal, even-handed way." See Nancy
Fraser, Who Counts? Dilemmas of Justice in a Postwestphalian World, 41 ANTIPODE
281, 295 (2009).
70. I recognize that some may find my designation of two "eras" of international
law history itself contentious. I do not contest that the history I present is marked
more by fluidity rather than sharp distinction, but for purposes of this Article, I shall
focus primarily on underscoring the differences between the Westphalian and post-
Westphalian periods.
71. Melea Lewis et al., Introduction, in RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END
OF WESTPHALIA? 2 (Trudy Jacobsen et al. eds., 2008).
72. Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 AM. Soc. INT'L L.
PROC. 265 (2002).
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external interference in its internal affairs. Initially, such sovereignty
was also believed to be unconstrained by any higher international
power." As political theorist Nancy Frazer recounts, "'domestic'
space was imagined as the pacified civil realm of the social contract,
subject to law and obligations of justice, 'international' space was
envisioned as a state of nature ... devoid of any binding duties of
justice."74 This political order was further supported by policies of
national aggrandizement within well-established state structures and
the emphasis on national self-determination that accompanied the
formation of new nation states.
Central to the statist approaches of international relations was
the understanding that a focus on the sovereign assured, amongst
other things, a high degree of control for states in both domestic and
international spheres. Certain responsibilities and actions could be
attributed solely to the state, functions that were, as many would
come to argue, "inherently governmental."7 6 This construction of
control was used to justify the imperial colonization of area where no
"states" existed, as well as rule over less established nations that the
West could justify as failing states.77 Perhaps no function was
considered more central to the state's responsibility over its territory
than control over warfare. Indeed, the making of war was a primary
73. Fraser, supra note 69, at 282.
74. Id. Although this rigid conceptualization of state sovereignty has gradually
given way to certain qualifications, such as the imposition of universal agreements
including the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, these changes have been carefully guarded. Perhaps most
importantly, such qualifications did not impose upon the power of the state to
structure the systems of justice and regulation within its own borders, rather, they
simply provided stipulations on how states interacted with each other, adding a thin
layer of voluntary rules to the relatively blank international reality. See Melea Lewis
et al., supra note 71, at 3.
75. Jost Delbruck, The Widely Forgotten Legacy of Max Huber's Sociology of
International Law: International Relations and International Law Today: A Comment,
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33 (August Reinisch & Ursula Kriebaun
eds., 2007).
76. Marina Caparini, Applying a Security Governance Perspective to the
Privatisation of Security, in PRIVATE ACTORS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE 265
(Marina Caparini & Alan Bryden eds., 2006).
77. Jordan J. Paust, Non-State Actor Participation in International Law and the
Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 977, 992 (2011). See also John Westlake,
CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136-38 (photo. reprint 1982)
(1894) (suggesting that "it is only the recognition of such sovereignty by the members
of the [civilized] international society which concerns us, that of uncivilized natives
international law takes no account").
2012] 47
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
means by which new sovereignties were created and defined. Thus,
under the statist regime a strong system of Trinitarian warfare
developed, whereby the government was understood to direct the
war, state-controlled armies fought the war, and civilians suffered.7 8 It
was somewhat implicitly understood that this function was so
essential to the state that the military could not be allocated to
outside authority. Military professionals were carefully shielded from
the private market and mercenaries were eschewed in favor of state
armies, which allowed states to consolidate control over military
affairs. As one scholar argued, soldiers "deal not in goods, but in life
and death. The application of their craft has potential implications
for the rise and fall of governments."79 To many, the state monopoly
on violence was a fundamental linchpin in the international system.
Building upon the preeminence of the State as purported by IR
theorists, the structure and substance of international law in the
Westphalian era was largely coordinate with the understanding of
international relations as inter-state relations." In 1963, J. L. Brierly
defined international law as "the body of rules and principles of
actions which are binding upon civilized States in their relations with
one another."8 2  Positivist international legal scholars embraced
sovereignty and formalism as the functional limits of the law. 3 They
78. Tanay Kumar Nandi & Satabdee Mohanty, The Emergence of Private
Military Firms and Their Impact on Global Human Rights, at 2 n.7 (Apr. 23, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1594994.
79. PHILLIPPE CONTAMINE, WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 158 (Basil Blackwell
1984, 1980).
80. SHEEHY, supra note 24, at 68.
81. Duruigbo, supra note 66, at 222.
82. J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
83. Slaughter, supra note 68, at 24. It would be disingenuous to suggest that this
framework was not without critics of some kind. Several theorists have argued that
the proposition that international law is confined to the relations of the State, while
popular, is historically inaccurate. They suggest that, in fact, understandings of
international law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries readily recognized both
the state and the individual, and only in the nineteenth century did the subjects of
international law become more limited. Although notable, these claims were
undoubtedly within the minority, as most governments, international organizations,
and scholars continued to adhere to the statist limitations of international law. See
MALCOME SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (5th ed. 2003); MARK W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 239-46 (4th ed. 2003); Duruigbo, supra note
66, at 234; Paust, supra note 77 (arguing that "invidious consequences occur when
judges cling to clearly ahistorical assumptions about international law and rule
erroneously that customary international law is 'created only be achieving universal
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widely agreed that states were the singular subjects of international
law, with other actors existing only as objects of the law, interacting
with the international legal system but only indirectly through their
national governments.' This dualist structure appears time and time
again in the international law literature - the forms are varied, but the
premise remains the same: while domestic law may deal with
individuals, international law regulates only the relations between
states, and only states are subject to it." Again, state control over
violence was central to this structure; states could not presume to
have singular responsibility for protecting individual rights if they did
not hold a monopoly over violence.'
Closely connected to this conceptualization of international law
was an understanding of justice as a nationalistic concern. "The
political boundaries of the state are perceived to mark the legitimate
limits of moral obligations."8  Within the context of human rights,
this created a system whereby the obligation to respect human rights
was conferred upon the State, which dictated the extent to which they
were realized via concepts of citizenship.8 Justice was carefully
demarcated along territorial borders, and the State its primary duty
holder. Non-state actors might be obliged to comply with human
rights as dictated by national law, but could not bear any obligations
deriving directly from international law.89
recognition and acceptance as a norm in the relations of States inter se."') (quoting
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol, Co. 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2nd Cir. 2010)).
84. Definitions of these terms within the context of international law can be
found at supra note 65.
85. Duruigbo has compiled an impressive list of these historical definitions. See
Duruigbo, supra note 66 at n.55 (citing GEORGE B. DAVIS, OUTLINES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH AN ACCOUNT OF ITS ORIGINS AND SOURCES AND OF ITS
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 2 (1887)); "international law as '[t]he rules which
determine the conduct of the general body of civilized States in their dealings with
each other."' Id. (citing THOMAS J. LAWRENCE, A HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1898)); "International law, [as] that branch of law which
relates to the conduct of independent states." Id. (citing ROLAND R. FOULKE, A
TREATISE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY ON THE
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE LAWS OF HUMAN CONDUCT 138 (Vol. 1, 1920)).
86. SHEEHY, supra note 24, at 68.
87. FLORIAN WETTSTEIN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND GLOBAL
JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTION 86
(2009).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 157.
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B. Changing Realities
Beginning in the last half century, it began to be suggested by
academics that perhaps a Westphalian approach was not fully
representative of twentieth century reality." Although still popular to
most, statist understandings of society increasingly contained
marginalized spaces where actors beyond the state were both
overlooked and under-regulated. Such a narrow concept of global
relations inevitably ignored the larger truths to be drawn from
understanding international society to involve a multitude of
influential actors. Indeed, despite the marginalized space in which
they operated, these "other" actors were by no means insignificant;
included amongst them were corporate entities that were of
increasing importance in modern economic and political
developments. While Keynesianism and the state-centric welfare
system had once dominated the economic agenda, these formative
years saw a gradual shift in preferences toward the marketplace for
the organization and fulfillment of public needs. Be it the
outsourcing of state functions or the privatization of public services,
the idea that the marketplace should be the solution became the
default international neoliberal model.91
Hand in hand with privatization was the move towards
globalization; together, the two trends embraced the belief that free
market competition across all borders maximized efficiency and
effectiveness. 92 Globalization led, amongst other consequences, to the
"dramatic increase in investment by multinational companies in the
developing world, the sense that the economic might of some
corporations had eroded the power of the state, and the work of the
WTO and IMC in requiring states to be more hospitable to foreign
90. PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 372 (1990);
Michael Reiterer, Book Review, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 970 (1987) (reviewing RUTH
DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983)).
91. SINGER, supra note 4, at 66. Privatization has generally been defined as the
"deliberate and policy-based transfer of certain public function, tasks, or services
from the state to private actors who then carry them out." See Hallo de Wolf, supra
note 9, at 317. Hallo de Wolf also notes a definition put forth by the Council of
Europe suggesting that privatization is "the total or partial transfer from public to
private ownership or control of a public undertaking so that it ceases to be a public
undertaking." Recommendation No. R (93)7 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on Privatisation of Public Undertakings and Activities, 500th Meeting
(Oct. 18, 1993).
92. SINGER, supra note 4, at 67.
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investment."' Concurrently, this expansion led to a decentralization
and fragmentation of power, greatly diversifying the "actors" within
international society. The scope of actors intimately involved in
international decision-making grew to include, not only states, but
also associations, political parties, trade unions, multinational
corporations, and quasi-official bodies.94 Society was becoming more
privatized and more pluralized, increasingly blurring the divide
between private and public. What was happening was a normative
shift in worldviews.
In response, the works of several prominent IR theorists began
to question statist premises and argued for a framework of
international relations that acknowledged a broader range of
institutional powers.95 Grounded in cosmopolitan beliefs, these
theorists recognized that the growing complexity of societies and
societal interactions necessitated a changing theoretical framework,
one that incorporated the variety of actors who occupy important
transnational roles.' This framework now often takes the form of
"globalism," which encourages the recognition of international
cultural, political, and economic interdependence, as well as shifting
centers of power to accommodate actors beyond the state." It is a
form of "dispersed sovereignty," which acknowledges that territorial
demarcations of government functions cannot resolve all domestic
and international concerns.99 At its most extreme, sovereignty itself is
a concept that while difficult to expel in the present political
environment, is ultimately unhelpful to the establishment of global
justice.9
At the same time as the notion of acknowledging only inter-state
93. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 447 (2001).
94. Id.
95. See generally NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE (2009) (hereinafter SCALES
OF JUSTICE); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE (1997); Phil Williams,
Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND SECURITY NETWORK (2008), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/ Publications/Detail/?id=93880&lng=en.
96. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33(2) PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113,
119 (2005).
97. Winston P. Nagan et al., The Changing Character of Sovereignty in
International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 141 (2004).
98. Andrew Kuper, Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a
Cosmopolitan Law of Persons, 28(5) POL. THEORY 640, 657 (2000).
99. Nagel, supra note 96, at 119.
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relations began to prove untenable, nationalistic notions of justice
began to unravel as well.1" Many states were too weak or corrupt to
enforce human rights obligations within their territories. Others,
while not rendered incompetent, frequently subjugated justice to
larger pursuits of economic and political power. International
humanitarian and human rights crises suggested that States, as the
primary conveyors of justice, were not fully upholding their duties.
Additionally, when a state failed to bear its human rights obligations,
there were few means for addressing subsequent injustice. This was
due, in large part to the fact that international law has continued to
identify almost singularly with the sovereign state, an insistence that
has profoundly affected its development. Even within the age of
globalization and privatization, the majority of international law
structures and frameworks continue to adhere to the traditional
rhetoric of the state as the primary subject of international law.
International law has undergone some transformation in recent
decades; in certain contexts, such as humanitarian law and
international criminal law, other entities besides the state are brought
within their direct purview and charged with narrow categories of
legal obligations."o' Nevertheless, scholars, jurists, and politicians
tread these lines cautiously, frequently concerned about allocating
too much authority outside traditional structures. By example, John
Ruggie, the UN Special Rapporteur on Business and Human Rights,
even in the face of considerable evidence regarding the powerful role
of corporations in contemporary society, continues to argue that
outside the confines of international criminal law, the state remains
the sole holder of international legal obligations." The incongruence
of this understanding is particularly significant given the numerous
100. Wettstein, supra note 87, at 158.
101. Duruigbo, supra note 66, at 227. For example, international humanitarian
law places duties on armed groups to respect certain rights of persons under their
control and international criminal law allows private individual actors to be held
accountable for certain human rights atrocities, such as genocide and slavery. See
Ratner, supra note 93, at 466-67. Notably the most recent definition of international
law according to the Restatement (Third)'s Definition of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States "consists of rules and principles of general application dealing with
the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations Inter
sei, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 (1987). This is likely one
of the more progressive definitions available and is still centered on the state.
102. Duruigbo, supra note 66, at 223-24.
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rights and benefits bestowed upon corporations to their advantage.103
As Edward Duruigbo suggests, "the continued viability of the
international system depends upon the close conformity of public
international law to international realities."' In failing to engage in
such parallelism, the systems of regulation fundamental to
international law are increasingly disconnected from international
realities. Thus, despite their growing power, transnational
corporations, international nongovernmental organizations, and
resistance groups such as the Taliban and Hamas, have no primary
legal status within our current structures.105
This strict adherence to statist conceptions limits the ability of
international law to fully conceptualize the roles of non-state actors
within the international arena, and perpetuates the increasingly false
theoretical distinction between the public and private. When
considered in tandem, the clear trends in global society and
"globalist" theories are increasingly at odds with the regulatory
framework of international law. On both a theoretical and a practical
level, this creates an [A]ccountability gap separating the trajectory of
international relations and that of international law, despite the
latter's supposed management of the former. The result is that the
activities of a variety of actors now recognized and incorporated
within theories of "global governance" are not yet under direct
international legal control, even when such activities represent a clear
breach of the stipulations and regulations of the international legal
system.'0 As such, this theoretical [A]ccountability gap manifests
itself in the form of smaller, and more tangible, [a]ccountability gaps,
in particular, for purposes of this Article, the gap in the regulation of
PMSCs.' 7 Although, in modern times, there is almost no discernable
difference between private and public soldiers, the established
103. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
104. Duruigbo, supra note 66, at 260.
105. The emphasis here must be placed on the notion of primary legal status.
Undoubtedly few would argue that non-state actors are not currently accorded the
legal status conferred on States, or even individuals, under existing law. This is
despite their powerful presence. See id. at 226. However, there are compelling
arguments that non-state actors have been recognized by international law. See infra
note 165.
106. Durugibo, supra note 66, at 260.
107. This is not the only way that the [Aiccountability gap is manifested. The
theoretical discordance it represents is increasingly obvious in international aid
regulation and corporate social responsibility more generally.
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national and international legal system created to deal with public
militaries hold virtually no authority over PMSCs.1'o
C. Manifest Misalignments: The Case of PMSCsm
Given the state's traditional role as the purveyor of military
services, most efforts to regulate the actions of those involved in war
and conflict focus on the responsibility of the state and the duties of
public officials under domestic and international law. Yet, in recent
years, as this paper illustrates, even the previously sacrosanct
responsibilities of security and warfare have found themselves the
subject of privatization. As neoliberal trends towards outsourcing
have encouraged privatization of government functions, states have
come to increasingly rely on the private sector for the performance of
military functions once the exclusive province of the state. The
particularities of this phenomenon have transformed traditional
structures of state security into "security governance" - "the
management and control of the process by which security is being
provided by multiple types of agents and actors beyond the stateo -
leading some to argue that the privatization of military functions is
the penultimate sign of state deconstruction."
However, both domestic and international regimes put in place
to regulate the military functions of the state have failed to account
for this shift, leaving PMSCs, as non-state actors, to operate largely
outside of the law. Despite efforts by some to identify a "regime of
responsibility" within our current political and economic structures
that applies to PMSCs, reality suggests that no current framework
exists. The inadequacies of these statist frameworks can be seen in
108. ISENBERG, supra note 4, at 12.
109. Several have argued, including PMSCs themselves, that legal frameworks of
accountability are only a small part of the equation, and, in keeping with the
privatization narrative, the strongest forms of regulation will be achieved through the
markets themselves. Following the lead of many scholars, this Article will not discuss
market regulation in great detail, as the unique circumstances of conflict make clear
that, even if one subscribes to the fundamental believe in the ability of the market to
correct itself, the normal rules of economics do not always apply. Information is
frequently scarce and demand often outstrips supply. For more information on the
merits, or lack thereof, of this argument, see PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC ORDER: THE
OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMITS, supra note 4, at 122-31.
110. Caparini, supra note 76, at 264.
111. See Clifford Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing,
and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 882-83 (2004).
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both the domestic and international context.112
1. Existing Domestic Regulations
From a domestic perspective, most PMSCs are held accountable
via the country of incorporation, what this Article shall refer to as the
"source" state. This is because, in many cases, the territorial state in
which the PMSC operates is simply unable to provide the legal and
judicial structures necessary for prosecution."' Within the United
States, one of the most significant source states, there are two limited
laws that can be used to hold contractors accountable: the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)114 and the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)."' The UCMJ, which extends military
jurisdiction to people serving or accompanying Armed Forces
overseas would seem to provide a mode of criminal liability for
PMSCs. However, in Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court held that the
UCMJ, and its accompanying system of court martial, was not an
appropriate means for trying civilians who have accompanied the
Armed Forces in times of peace."1 6 In 1970, the Court of Military
Appeals further clarified that the UCMJ applies only when there is a
declared war, rendering the UCMJ largely ineffective in holding
* * * *117
civilians criminally accountable.
112. This Article will not focus extensively on the domestic law of the territorial
state given the variability of this regime. Rather, it will focus primarily on United
States law and international law, which provide the predominate forms of legal
accountability, given that a majority of PMSCs are based in the United States.
Obviously, for those companies based outside of the United States, other domestic
laws would apply. Generally, however, one finds that limited domestic accountability
is a trend across almost all Western jurisdictions. Under the Withdrawal Agreement
between the United States and Iraq, Iraq does have primary jurisdiction over PMSC
and PMSC employees that are working with Iraqi official territory as United States
nationals or third country nationals, but the agreement does not cover those persons
that normally reside within Iraq.
113. This is somewhat intuitive as PMSCs are likely to be located in states
engaged in civil or international conflict, and thus not necessarily with the capacity to
engage in judicial exercises. Both Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrative of this fact.
114. Prohibition on Interrogation of Detainees by Contractor Personnel, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, div. A, tit. X, § 1038, 123 Stat. 2451, (2009) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801
(2006)).
115. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2006).
116. 354 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1957) ("and under our Constitution courts of law alone are
given the power to try civilians for their offenses against the United States").
117. United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (1970). This decision severely
restricts the impact of the UCMJ because the United States government has been
increasingly reluctant to declare the conflicts it engages in as "wars." See ISENBERG,
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In an effort to respond to the inadequacies of the UCMJ,
Congress introduced MJEA in 2000, extending jurisdiction to those
"employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United
States."". This jurisdiction was eventually extended under the Patriot
Act to "the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military,
or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign
States . . ." but even under this broader understanding the MEJA has
rarely been used successfully against PMSC employees.9
supra note 4, at 147. In 2006 the UCMJ was amended to cover extend jurisdiction
over both declared war and "contingency operations." The amendment was viewed
with skepticism and has been called a "knee-jerk reaction" to pressure over
contracting issues. Id. at 148.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (2006).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 7(9)(A) (2006). The DOJ reports that it has charged only twelve
individuals under MEJA since 2000. Not all of these have been successful
prosecutions. For more details, see Closing Legal Loopholes: Prosecuting Sexual
Assaults and Other Violent Crimes Committed Overseas by American Civilians in a
Combat Environment: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
110th Cong. (Apr. 9, 2008) (Statement of Sigal P. Mandelker, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). Finally, in 2007,
Congress introduced the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act, which attempted
to extend criminal culpability to all contractors employed under contracts with the
United States government. Kemp, supra note 11, at 490. While the Act passed the
House, it failed to pass the Senate. Most recently, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has chosen to pursue avenues that effect PMSCs at the bank, rather than in
court. In November 2010, the DOD released the interim rule, "Award-Fee
Reductions for Health and Safety Issues" which requires contracting officers to
consider reduction or denial of award fees if contractor or subcontractor actions
jeopardize the health or safety of government personnel. See Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Award-Fee Reductions for Health and Safety
Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 69360 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified 48 C.F.R. pts. 216, 252).
This rule amends the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
pursuant to section 823 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2010 (P.L. 111-84). Id. While not yet fully implemented, the rule has faced criticism
from organizations such as the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) for its
narrow applicability. Letter from Neil Gordon, Investigator for Project on
Government Oversight (POGO), to Amy Williams, Member of the Defense
Acquisition Regulations Council (Jan. 11, 2011) available at www.pogo.org/pogo-
files/letters/contract-oversight/co-ca-20110111.html. As POGO notes, the rule
currently applies solely to harm caused to United States personnel, thereby ignoring
the extensively documented harm occurring to civilians, military personnel, and
contractors not hailing from the United States. Additionally, the scope of incidents
covered within the rule is exceptionally narrow, under the definition the incident
must involve "a criminal action that results in a conviction; a civil or administrative
action that results in a 'finding of fault or liability'; or a civil, criminal, or
administrative action resolved by consent or compromise with 'an acknowledgement
of fault by the Contractor."' Id. This ignores the majority of abusive conduct
committed by PMSCs as they rarely result in formal convictions or findings of
liability. Id. In attempting to respond to this proposed rule, POGO provides
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The inadequacies of current domestic laws meant to govern
military conduct when applied to PMSCs are by no means confined to
the United States. Rather, there is a systematic tendency of source
states to carve out numerous exceptions for PMSCs, or simply chose
not to prosecute them at all.120 For instance, the United Kingdom,
also a significant source state for PMSCs, revealed in 2009 that its
policy would encourage PMSCs to engage in self-regulation, rather
than creating an overarching regulatory structure.121 Similarly, France
has no law that regulates the activities of French PMSCs overseas.
Current accountability resides with the D6fense Conseil International
(DCI), which is a para-statal corporation.2 2 How DCI holds PMSCs
accountable, and is itself accountable to the French government, is
unclear.123
These broad failures of accountability make clear that states are
not the ideal regulators of PMSC activity. From an economic
perspective, the global trends towards privatization have left most
governments without the capacity to support such large resource
intensive endeavors, leaving them functionally reliant on PMSCs to
support their wide array of military endeavors abroad. While this is
intuitively the case for countries with limited resources and
constrained defense budgets, it is also true within nations that have
historically devoted significant portions of their GDP towards
defense. Ironically, in countries like the United States, research has
found that PMSCs are not, in fact, any cheaper than utilizing existing
federal programs and employees.124 However, "agency officials'
compelling evidence and justification for the assertion that current domestic
frameworks for PMSC regulation, both legal and political, are woefully inadequate
for properly addressing accountability. Id.
120. See generally Kemp, supra note 11.
121. Richard Norton-Taylor, Foreign Office to Propose Self-Regulation For Private
Military Firms, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/apr/24/private-military-firms-government.
122. GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES
(DCAF), Report on Swiss-Based Military and Security Service Providers Operating in
Crisis and Conflict Regions, Phase II: Comparative Study of Regulatory Approaches
(Feb. 18, 2008).
123. Id.
124. POGO recently released a detailed research report finding that the United
States government does not save money by relying on private contractors. POGO
found that in thirty-three out of thirty-five federal job classifications, the government
was paying contractors, on average, twice what it paid federal employees to do the
same work. See Danielle Brian, Government must weigh true cost of private
contractors, THE DAILY CALLER (Oct. 11, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/10/11/
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decisions to heavily rely on contractors for professional and technical
expertise has shifted the balance of knowledge to the extent that the
government has lost much of its mission-essential organic
capability." 12 5 As a result, it is no longer economically feasible for
federal agencies to resume tasks previously assigned to contractors.
As the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics recently said when testifying before the Wartime
Commission, "We're simply not going to go to war without
contractors."1 26
Additionally, efforts to regulate PMSCs at the domestic level
face the same problems seen with regulation of corporations more
broadly - the development of an international "race to the bottom."
National legal standards concerning PMSCs will inevitably vary, and
PMSCs, as rational commercial actors, can be expected to
deliberately assess these regulatory differences with an eye towards
minimizing their legal burden. Developing countries may be tempted
to offer reduced accountability in exchange for foreign investment,
while countries with significant military presence, such as the United
States, may become so reliant on PMSCs that the interest in retaining
the services of a PMSC overrides any interest in preventing violations
of human rights.127 Even where national regulation appears strong,
the transnational nature of economic activities and the global
dispersion of assets makes it "almost impossible for any single state to
be able to place some of these [PMSCs] under their control or
exercise any meaningful influence over them."1 8  Thus, what is
apparent is that when responsibility for regulating PMSCs is left in
government-must-weigh-true-cost-of-private-contractors/.
125. COMMIssIoN ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, supra note 5, at 19.
126. Id. at 18 (quoting Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Commission Hearing, Mar. 28, 2011,
transcript at 39).
127. See Rory Sullivan, Legislating for Responsible Corporate Behavior: Domestic
Law Approaches to an International Issue, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST
FOR JUSTICE, VOL 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 183 (Sorcha MacLeod ed., 2006).
Although not as extreme as human rights violations, a recent DOD report indicates
the extent to which United States reliance on PMSCs appears to override other
concerns. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CONTRACTING
FRAUD (2011). The report found that from Fiscal Year 2007 to Fiscal Year 2009, the
DOD awarded almost $270 billion in contracts to ninety-nine contractors found liable
in civil fraud cases and $682 million to thirty contractors convicted of criminal fraud.
Id.
128. Duruigbo, supra note 66, at 250.
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the hands of the state, and its domestic efforts, PMSCs will likely
continue to act with impunity.
2. Existing International Regulations
In addition to being rendered impotent by political and legal
circumventions, domestic laws are inherently limited by their
applicability only to those corporations willingly incorporated within
that state. Complicated issues of extraterritoriality, overlapping
jurisdiction, and international regulations can also arise. 12 ' Thus,
many have advocated for the introduction of international standards
to govern state responsibility for PMSCs, ensuring accountability
regardless the domestic context.30 Unfortunately, such options are
remarkably limited and intrinsically inadequate by virtue of their
statist frame.
Within the realm of international human rights (IHR), continued
reliance on the state has made direct accountability for PMSCs
seemingly untenable. Yet, the international community of states has
also taken great pains to ensure that international treaties and
regulations cannot hold source states accountable for the acts of their
PMSCs. For instance, the 1989 UN Convention against Recruitment,
Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, which banned the use
of mercenaries,13' does not apply in the PMSC context.132 Despite the
privatized nature of the military services that PMSCs provide, the
international legal community has generally been hesitant to include
129. For more information on the complexities of prosecuting PMSCs under
domestic law, see Cedric Ryngaert, Litigating Abuses Committed by Private Military
Companies, 19(5) EUR. J. INT'L L. 1035 (2008).
130. Although the focus here is clearly on legal standards, compelling arguments
have also been made for the application of unique international moral and ethical
standards to PMSCs. See James Pattison, Deeper Objections to the Privatisation of
Military Force, 18(4) THE J. POL. PHIL. 425 (2010).
131. International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and
Training of Mercenaries, opened for signature Dec. 31, 1990, 2163 U.N.T.S. 75
(entered into force Oct. 20, 2001) and Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Protocol I].
132. Even were the Convention held to apply here, the United States, United
Kingdom, Israel, and South Africa have all failed to ratify it, thereby greatly limiting
its utility. See Participants in the International Convention against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, available at
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg
no=XVIII-6&chapter= 18&lang=en.
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them within the purview of the Convention."' While some have
argued for the expansion of these international restrictions against
mercenaries to PMSCs, numerous complications counsel against such
an adaptation. 134 Even were the Convention to apply, it does not
make it a crime to be a mercenary - rather, it permits mercenary
prisoners-of-war to be denied status as unlawful combatants. 135
Unfortunately, other than the provisions of this Convention, there are
no other IHR provisions that prohibit or limit the activities of
PMSCs. 136
In addition to IHR, within the context of armed conflict, the
question of regulating PMSCs also raises the specter of international
humanitarian law (IHL).'" While IHL allows individuals to be held
internationally accountable for their actions under certain
circumstances, such provisions do not extend to international
organizations or other non-state entities such as PMSCs. Even
accepting that grave limitation, scholars have shown that IHL is
likewise inadequate for dealing with private contractors as
individuals; their complicated roles as both armed participants and
civilians make them difficult to classify within the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions. Article 47 of Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, while it does not criminalize mercenarism, does deny
them the prisoner of war or combatant status protections that soldiers
133. See SINGER, supra note 4, at 44-45. The Convention defines mercenaries as
actors who have taken part in the conflict, have been specially recruited to fight in
that conflict and have not been sent by a state that is not a party to the conflict. This
definition would be difficult to apply to most PMSCs working in countries such as
Iraq or Afghanistan, where many may be providing only support services and come
from first-world countries only peripherally related to the conflict.
134. For a detailed discussion of the applicability of current mercenary laws to
PMSCs, see Gaston, supra note 12. Although this Article will not go into great detail,
suffice to say that there is wide consensus that the mercenary definition would be
particularly difficult to apply to the majority of PMSCs. Additionally, Western
nations, from which the majority of PMSCs arise, have been notoriously hostile to
provisions against mercenaries, arguing that they are incapable of controlling the
actions of their nationals when abroad.
135. Id. at 232.
136. Hallo de Wolf, supra note 9, at 325.
137. Although the discussion here focuses on the incongruencies between the role
of PMSCs in conflict and the elements of the Geneva Convention, it should also be
noted that some subsets of PMSCs, such as private security protection or bodyguards
may act largely outside the context of conflict and thus are not subject to IHL
standards.
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typically receive.' However, the definition of who constitutes a
mercenary is a complicated one, with six requirements that must be
met, including "taking direct part in the hostilities" and "neither a
national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled
by a Party to the conflict." 139 The general consensus amongst IHL
scholars is that, given these restrictions, there is a very limited basis
for PMSCs to be classified as mercenaries under the Conventions.140
Given the apparent inability of international law as it is currently
structured to address PMSCs independent of the state, despite their
pivotal role, the only restrictions directly applicable to PMSCs take
the form of voluntary guidelines and informal codes of conduct.14'
The most widely regarded of these codes is the International Code of
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.142 The code was
finalized in October 2010 and currently has 211 signatories, including
Aegis, DynCorp, G3S, and Xe.'43 It requires signatory companies to
"operate in a manner that recognizes and supports the rule of law;
respects human rights, and protects the interest of their clients."'44
138. Protocol I, supra note 131, art. 47(1).
139. Id. art. 47(2).
140. Govern & Bales, supra note 12, at 71.
141. Another example not discussed at great length here is the Montreux
Document, which was created by the International Committee of the Red Cross and
the government of Switzerland with the intention of developing "best practices"
regarding the utilization of PMSCs. See Montreux Document Afg.-Angl.-Can.-
China-Fr.-Ger.-Iraq-Pol.-Sierra Leone-S. Afr.-Swed.-Switz.-U.K.-U.S., Sept. 17, 2008,
U.N. Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636. Although the Montreux Document is not legally
binding, it asks parties to agree to be responsible under international law. Id. On
October 8, 2009, the United States and sixteen other countries signed the Montreux
Document. See Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns and Money: The Governance of
Business Activities in Conflict Zones, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 334-35 (2011).
Unfortunately, many of the incidents of violence and human rights abuses reported in
this Article, and many not recounted here, continue to occur despite the Document.
There is no doubt that this is due in large part to the voluntary nature of the
document and its lack of enforcement provisions or structures, but the vagueness of
its provisions has also been criticized. Perhaps most importantly, the Montreux
Document approaches PMSC accountability purely from the perspective of the state,
rather than focusing on the obligations that should be imposed on PMSCs
themselves. In doing so it continues to adhere to outdated Statist intentions.
142. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE
PROVIDERS (2010), available at http://www.icoc-psp.org/ [hereinafter CODE OF
CONDUCT].
143. See id. for a list of companies that have signed the code is available at. See
also Michon Mortzouris, Private Security Companies Need More Regulation, INST.
FOR SECURITY STUD. (Oct. 2011).
144. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 142, 6.
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This code is not the first to attempt to impose human rights
compliance upon PMSCs. Industry associations such as the
International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) have attempted
to regulate PMSC conduct via codes and have included member
companies such as ArmorGroup and DynCorp.'45 Unfortunately,
such attempts betray the fundamental problem with voluntary codes
of conduct: they are only voluntary. In 2007, when Blackwater was a
member of the IPOA and subject to their voluntary code, they
became embroiled in the Nisour Square incident. In response, IPOA
attempted to open an investigation into whether Blackwater had
violated the code.'46 Two days after the investigation was announced,
Blackwater withdrew from the association. 147
This survey of current efforts to regulate PMSCs, and their
almost linear focus on domestic efforts and state responsibility within
international law, is both theoretically, and practically significant.
Perhaps more importantly, it suggests that we need new tools and
means of exploring the contributions of private actors such as PMSCs
to society, and conversely, new means of holding such actors
accountable for their failures to contribute to the development of rule
of law. As one author has suggested, we need no less than a new
understanding of the schematic of international law that allows for
the regulation of PMSCs within global governance.148 Part IV of this
Article proposes a new normative framework meant to guide such
understandings. It is a first step, an initial effort, to begin to close the
gap between current international realities and statist conceptions of
international law within the context of military endeavors.
IV. A New Regime of Responsibility
Taken in isolation, the [a]ccountability gap has spurred
numerous remedies predicated in the existing statist structures meant
to govern the military and conflict, as Part III.C illustrates. Scholars
and advocates have urged enhanced safeguards and legislative reform
ad infinitum, to the extent that it has been argued that the debate is
145. Chesterman, supra note 141, at 14.
146. ISENBERG, supra note 4, at 82.
147. Id.
148. Michael A. Santoro, Post-Westphalia and Its Discontents: Business,
Globalization and Human Rights in Political and Moral Perspective, 20(2) Bus.
ETHICS Q. 285, 287 (Apr. 2010).
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now characterized by an "intellectual, scholastic staleness."149 This
Article seeks to diverge from these common themes to consider the
impunity of PMSCs through the lens of the larger incongruencies
between international law and international relations.
Grounded in the macro understandings of the [A]ccountability
gap, this Article argues for the application of certain binding human
rights obligations for PMSCs.so Such an approach is a practical
remedy for the urgent human rights violations currently occurring
under the PMSC regime and an important initial step in recognizing
these non-state actors within our international law framework. This
approach is also a symbolic step towards improving our
understanding of the way new legal norms of accountability can be
constructed in a time when the constructs of the nation-state are less
significant than they once were. In essence, efforts to remedy this
[a]ccountability gap can simultaneously work to remedy the
[A]ccountability gap as well. By building upon, and extending,
existing legal concepts and doctrines, and by drawing from the
parallel transitions already taking place within IR, the next sections of
this Article will provide a framework for the application of
international norms to PMSCs.
Addressing the [a]ccountability gap manifested in the regulation
of PMSCs is not the only step that can, or should, be taken in
addressing the broader problems identified in Part III. However, the
approach provided here recognizes that the urgent reality of the
PMSC gap, as described in Part II.B, and the unique nature of
PMSCs, provide the most optimal circumstances for taking the
doctrinal step of applying international standards to corporate non-
state actors. Unlike multinational corporations engaged primarily in
commercial and trade activities, PMSCs perform a role that is,
essentially, the outsourcing of a state function. These functions,
which often have significant human rights implications, do not receive
the same level of regulation or enforcement normally accorded to
states, because of the PMSC's non-state status. In conceptualizing a
path for international law that gradually expands to include
149. Nagan & Hammer, supra note 24, at 432.
150. I use the term "human rights obligations" here in the broadest sense of the
phrase. Thus, it incorporates not only traditional nonderogable rights, but also those
rights enshrined in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, and those environmental
rights that can be derived from existing international obligations.
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consideration of the multitude of actors who comprise our
geopolitical reality, it seems only logical that one of the first
categories of actors to be addressed would be those that blur the line
between the state and non-state by acting such a quasi-governmental
capacity. The unique nature of PMSCs in undertaking traditional
state functions provides a solid foundation for the argument that
addressing their [a]ccountability gap is both doctrinally feasible and
necessary to the reduction of the [A]ccountability gap.
A. A Framework for Analysis: Limited Legal Personality
Although the application of binding human rights norms to
PMSCs calls for a shift in the development of the current
jurisprudence of international law, it must also be grounded in the
logical extension of existing legal doctrines. The framework
presented here does not seek to make PMSCs an exception to
established law. Rather, the incorporation of PMSCs can serve to
expand the current theoretical paradigms related to the construction
and application of international law. The first step in this process is
the orientation of PMSCs, as non-state actors, within the jurisdiction
of international law. Put another way, how can they be understood as
subjects upon which international law bestows an obligation?
It is widely agreed that in order to be subject to international
law, an entity must have what is termed international "legal
personality.""' Having such a status indicates that one is "capable of
possessing international rights and duties and endowed with the
capacity to take certain types of actions on the international plane." 52
Exactly who can claim legal personality is itself contentious: states are
clearly subjects of international law, and modern developments now
include individuals under certain circumstances as well. For the most
part, however, all entities beyond the state and individual have been
described not as by what they are, but as what they cannot be. Philip
Alston describes this as the "Not-a-Cat Syndrome."' As new actors
have gained prominence on the international stage, international law
has defined them as "non-governmental organizations" and, as we
151. Duruigbo, supra note 66, at 223.
152. Id. at 225.
153. Philip Alston, The "Not-a-Cat" Syndrome: Can the International Human
Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors? in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 3-39 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
[Vol. 35:164
Transforming Accountability
have seen, "non-state actors."154 Such conceptualizations are rooted
in the old paradigm that sees states as preeminent and unique, and in
turn, marginalizes entire categories of powerful actors. To continue
to overlook these entities, including PMSCs, in such a way can only
be done at the doctrine's own peril. While the law continues to insist
on the state's centrality as the only acceptable legal personality, these
non-states have undoubtedly taken advantage of the marginalized
space in which they reside.
This Article suggests, in developing a framework for the
application of international human rights norms to PMSCs, that the
jurisdiction of international law is narrow and rigid only by its own
insistence. Rather than characterizing an entity as having or lacking
legal personality, the concept of legal personality can be seen as more
fluid than previously articulated."' Even conceding, for the purpose
of compromise and consistency, that states continue to be the primary
and predominate subjects of international law, the notion that this
recognition has to be exclusionary is unfounded. As James Brierly
suggests, "Even the state, great and powerful institution as it is, can
never express more than a part of our personalities, only that part
which finds expression in the purpose or purposes for which the state
exists.""'
Over the last century, society has seen the gradual expansion of
those rights that fall within the "human rights" rubric. Civil and
political rights have given way to economic, social, and even
environmental rights. In a similar manner, it is now time for
international law to consider the expansion of the dutyholders of such
rights."' Such a proposition is not unfounded-Locke and Kant both
long ago conceptualized notions of rights and duties without
confining their ideas to the State.' 8 While the accumulation of State
power has emphasized the responsibilities of the sovereign, one need
not conclude that others cannot be held accountable for those duties
154. Id.
155. Duruigbo, supra note 66, at 222; Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational
Corporations and Developing Public International Law, DUKE L.J. 748, 774 (1983);
Wolfgang Friedmann, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233
(1964).
156. J. L. Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law, in THE BASIS OF
OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS 51 (H. Lauterpacht &
C.H.M. Waldock eds. 1958).
157. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 171 (1986).
158. Ratner, supra note 93, at 468.
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as well. Conversely, it is worth noting that recognition of multiple
dutyholders of human rights does not dilute the responsibilities
already established. Thus, just as the nature of human rights remain
equally as potent despite their expanding scope, so too will the
responsibilities of dutyholders remain forceful even as their numbers
expand.159 Bearing these notions in mind, it is time to radically
rethink our understanding of human rights obligations in order to
expand our traditional normative frameworks beyond the state.'"
The irony of such a "radical" approach is that it is grounded in
understandings that are a logical extension of prevailing assumptions.
Human rights are, in essence, rights that belong to an individual in all
circumstances as recognition of one's inherent dignity.16 Thus, the
implication that all entities and individuals should bear responsibility
for respecting such rights is far from impractical. Without such
obligations, the human rights framework would prove useless. While
expanding international legal personality beyond the state removes
the ability of the state to act as the sole mediator of human rights
protections, such a move does not eviscerate our current structures.162
159. Ratner acknowledges this as well, noting that the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and UN Human
Rights bodies which seeks to hold states accountable for violations by private actors
is an effective and expansive avenue for accountability and redress that should not be
ignored. Id. at 470.
160. Andrew Clapham urges this theoretical shift in his 2006 article. See Clapham,
supra note 13, at 511.
161. Id. at 514.
162. Indeed, in prefacing an argument for direct human rights obligations, several
prior researchers have pointed to evidence that direct obligations on non-state actors
have been implicitly recognized on several occasions by important international
bodies. For instance, both the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa specifically mention non-state armed groups
and attempt to impose obligations upon them. Similarly, the Security Council has
"called upon all parties to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law
to ensure the protection of civilian life." Annyssa Bellal et al., International Law and
Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 (881) INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 47,
67 (2011). And perhaps most importantly, the International Law Association, while
still against the application of human rights obligations directly upon non-state
actors, has conceded that non-state actors would be bound by jus cogens norms -
those norms "accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
See INT'L L. Ass'N, THE HAGUE CONFERENCE 2010, NON-STATE ACTORS, FIRST
REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE, NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AIMs,
APPROACH AND SCOPE OF PROJECT AND LEGAL ISSUES para. 3.2 (referencing Article
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And in the face of mounting evidence that PMSCs continue to be
held unaccountable for their human rights obligations, a theoretical
framework that provides broader means for enforcement better aligns
our international legal system with the powerful military services it is
meant to regulate. While some may argue that the broadening of
recognized actors will lead to confusion and chaos, I believe this new
framework is best understood under the auspices of complimentarity.
As Andrew Clapham suggests, "complimentarity allows us to see the
multiplicity of actors involved in a human rights infringement. The
act may give rise to responsibility for a state, an individual and an
organization . . .. In short, international law should provide that a
single event can generate multiple violations by a range of actors."'
1. The Basis for Limited Legal Personality: Relation to
Government
Understanding international legal personality as more fluid, it is
suggested a limited form of legal personality can then be applied to
PMSCs as non-state actors by virtue of their status as quasi-
governmental. As Steve Ratner argued, "when an enterprise has
close ties to the government it has prima facie a greater set of
obligations .. . this rules of state responsibility that make states liable
for the acts of some private actors can provide for the responsibility
of those private actors as well."" The PMSC, as a private actor
closely affiliated to the state, can take on a limited international legal
personality based on this relationship. This does not mean that all
PMSCs are inherently bestowed with international legal personality.
Rather, building on the justifications underlying this extension, a
PMSC would need to meet a test for the determination of state
affiliation.
While it has been argued in the past that rebel groups or de facto
regimes take on limited international obligations by virtue of their
exercising the de facto functions of the state, the logic underlying such
reasoning can be extended further." A PMSC need not be acting as
53 of the Vienna Convention). Jus cogens norms include prohibitions of aggression,
genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the
right to self-determination. Bellal et al., at 73.
163. ANDREW CLAPHAM, The Subject of Subjects and the Attribution of
Attribution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUEST FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION 58
(Vera Gowlland-Debbas et al. eds., 2010).
164. Ratner, supra note 93, at 499.
165. See Rudiger Wolfrum & Christine E. Philipp, The Status of the Taliban: Their
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a de facto government authority in order to incur international human
rights obligations. Instead, the focus can be placed on lesser
functionalities, with an entity necessarily triggering international
accountability when it undertakes action that has traditionally been
the province of the state.'" This would better align international law
with international realities by moving beyond outdated beliefs that
full governmental control is required in order for international legal
responsibility to apply. If one accepts the proposition above - that
legal personality can in fact be limited and conceptualized on a
spectrum - then full control of the government becomes unnecessary.
One can obtain limited international legal obligations by virtue of
engaging in an action that is inherently close to the function of the
state."'
The imposition of limited obligations on PMSCs that undertake
actions that are closely linked to the state in particular, has several
justifications. First, and perhaps most obviously, under such
circumstances the PMSC is closely aligned with the state and
benefiting from the state's immense resources and power, both of
Obligations and Rights under International Law, MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 559-601
(Vol. 6, 2002). See also Christian Tomuschat, who suggests "A movement struggling
to become the legitimate government of the nation concerned is treated by the
international community as an actor who, already at his embryonic stage, is subject to
the essential obligations and responsibilities every State must shoulder in the interest
of a civilized state of affairs amongst nations." Christian Tomuschat, The
Applicability of Human Rights Law to Insurgent Movements, in CRISIS MANAGEMENT
AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 586 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2004). Although less
frequently acknowledged, numerous international entities have also implicitly
recognized armed rebel/opposition groups as subject to international law. These
include the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, the Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the
International Law Commission, Security Council Resolutions. See CLAPHAM, supra
note 163.
166. Some may argue that the defining of relevant PMSCs in relation to the State
simply reinforces the nation-state paradigm. This Article, while suggesting that the
focus on states as legal actors must be broadened, does not mean to fully abdicate a
nation-state focus. Certainly, a connection to the state is useful in clarifying the
duties and obligations of corporations within a field of international law that is still
developing.
167. Such a proposition is by no means limited to the consideration of PMSCs.
Certainly other organizations and entities undertake work in close alignment with the
state and could be subject to additional obligations under the tests proposed here.
However, an expansive consideration of these possibilities and what entities may or
may not be implicated is beyond the scope of this Article, as mentioned at the
beginning of Part IV. Should, in the foreseeable future, a theoretical framework such
as the one proposed here be adopted, these will be important areas for further
consideration.
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which create a greater risk of human rights violations.1" Indeed,
PMSCs are often allocated access to influential resources and
information by virtue of their contracted position of the state, even
more so when their actions closely mirror those military
responsibilities previously confined to the state alone.169
Secondly, when a PMSC is engaging in actions that are
inherently governmental there is a strong likelihood that those are
actions for which the state is normally held accountable under
international law. The delegation of such acts to private actors does
not absolve the State of responsibility, nor insulate the private actors
themselves. Rather, "because the state is responsible for certain acts
of private actors, those actors can also be held responsible for the
same conduct under international law."' Finally, when a PMSC
undertakes actions normally conducted by the state, it stands to
reason that the state's ability and interest in regulating the conduct
may be diminished."' Among weaker governments this is often
particularly true, as the state itself has delegated the function
precisely because it is unable to implement and regulate it effectively
itself.17 2 However, it also holds true in Western governments like the
United States, where actions may be outsourced to PMSCs because
they are politically unfavorable or economically taxing, yet important
to covert military and political objectives. As such, the government is
168. Ratner, supra note 93, at 497.
169. For a detailed discussion of the mutually beneficial relationships between
PMSCs and their contracting governments within the context of Iraq, see ISENBERG,
supra note 4, at 67-104.
170. Ratner, supra note 93, at 497. See also Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom,
247 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50, 58 (1993) (holding that a state cannot "absolve itself from
responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies").
171. Ratner, supra note 93, at 497.
172. The often-cited example in this case is that of Sierra Leone. In the early
1990s cross-border rebel groups from Liberia began a concerted campaign to
terrorize Sierra Leone under the auspices of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
The RUF took advantage of existing ethnic tensions and underlying poverty to
plunge Sierra Leone into a violent civil war. The government was unable to provide
the training and equipment necessary to create a functioning military and instead
hired Executive Outcomes to fight the civil war on its behalf. Executive Outcomes
was ultimately successful, defeating the RUF in a matter of months, but did little to
capacitate Sierra Leone in the process (rather it was involved in training and arming
several soon-to-be government opposition groups), and the country was plunged
back into war several years later. See SINGER, supra note 4, at 110-15. As one author
puts it, Executive Outcomes "virtually held ransom to the entire politico-military and
economic system." Ranganathan, supra note 63, at 24.
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likely to be discouraged from active and open regulation given its
interests in avoiding attention altogether. Thus, interest in the
PMSC's actions is likely to wane with the untenability of the actions
themselves.
Some may argue that such justifications simply reiterate the need
for international accountability for states themselves. Such a
conclusion, however, simply continues to encourage a statist human
rights regime that is woefully out of date with reality, and falls victim
to the [A]ccountability gap identified in Part III. As the power of
PMSCs continue to grow and transcend borders, we cannot continue
to inhabit an outdated legal construct that relies on the State as the
mediator of a PMSC's human rights obligations."' The application of
limited legal personality for PMSCs, as suggested here, remedies this
problem by allowing for both states and PMSCs to be held directly
accountable for human rights violations under a system of
complimentarity. However, in order to effectively and carefully
implement this theoretical shift we must turn to how PMSCs can be
held directly accountable and, for purposes of the framework
identified here, what test should be used in determining which
PMSCs engage in activities that warrant the imposition of direct legal
obligations. Given the political and legal magnitude of this decision,
this Article does not propose one explicit test, but rather suggest two
possible options for further exploration; one grounded in existing
United States regulations and the other a recent suggestion by several
well-known scholars.
2. The "Inherently Governmental" Test
As mentioned previously, although most PMSCs likely engage in
actions that are essentially state functions, once cannot assume this is
true in every case. Within the context of the United States, there is a
history of jurisprudence and documentation that can be drawn upon
as one possible option for delineating those PMSCs that necessitate
direct regulation.'74 This is the concept of "inherently governmental"
173. See Part III.C.1-2.
174. It should be noted that while I utilize the inherently governmental doctrine
here, I do not apply it in the way that it has traditionally been applied. Under United
States law, the doctrine has been used not to determine whether non-state actors
have binding rights obligations, but rather to determine what functions should not be
delegated beyond the state. Thus, the traditional administrative perspective remains
grounded in statist paradigms, linking "inherently governmental actions" to the
province of the state. While I believe the identification of those actions that are
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activity. Within United States law, inherently governmental activity
has traditionally been used to that activity which cannot be performed
by a non-state actor."' For the purposes of this Article, I propose to
use the concept of 'inherently governmental' in a way that is
antithetical to its traditional understandings. That is, while inherently
governmental may normally distinguish those activities that are illegal
when performed by a PMSC, I propose that it be used not to prevent
PMSCs from undertaking certain actions, but rather to impose
additional obligations upon them when they do. This is due, in large
part, to the practical realities that suggest that PMSCs currently
undertake inherently governmental activity and will, due to political
and military necessity, continue to do so. As such, it seems that the
most effective use of such a test must accept such realities and seek to
work within them.
However, even putting practical realities aside, the justifications
underlying the use of "inherently governmental" in both
circumstances are the same. Both the official government policy and
this framework seek to identify those activities so closely aligned to
the state as to render an actor who undertakes them as an agent of
the state. Whether it is for purposes of identifying illegality or for
purposes of acknowledging where additional legal obligations are
required, the actions, and actors, identified are the same. As such, I
believe the concept represents a constructive means of utilizing
existing jurisprudence to effectuate a broader purpose. Much like the
expansion of legal personality, the use of "inherently governmental"
in such a fashion finds its roots in existing legal doctrine, but seeks to
closely aligned with the state is of fundamental importance, I seek to do so with the
understanding that when such actions are identified and undertaken by PMSCs, this
does not result in illegality, but rather a situation where legal obligations should be
extended to the PMSC.
175. L. Elaine Halchin et al., Inherently Governmental Functions and Other Work
Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees: The Obama
Administration's Proposed Policy Letter, in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT FOR CONGRESS 2 (2010). Interestingly, agencies charged with performing
such functions have traditionally been given liberal leeway, resulting in many
situations where critics have argued that outsourced activities should have been
classified as inherently governmental. For example, in 2008, Congress enacted
legislation to express their disapproval of certain functions being performed by
contractors in the DOD, which Congress felt were inherently governmental
functions. The legislation stated that Congress felt that "security operations for the
protection of resources . . . in uncontrolled or unpredictable high-threat
environments should ordinarily be performed by members of the Armed Forces."
P.L. 110-417, § 831, 122 Stat. 4534 (2008).
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rearrange that doctrine as a means of providing better alignment
between international relations and international law.
This would not be the first time that "inherently governmental"
has been used to identify private actions requiring further regulation.
The public function test for the state action doctrine in United States
law also acts to identify the actions of private parties that are inherent
government functions, but, like the test suggested here, does not
preclude agencies from contracting out such a function under the
FAIR act or FAR."' Instead, it acts to "constitutionalize delegations
that amount to the exercise of public authority," in order to
determine whether those actors must provide the same constitutional
rights to third parties that the government must provide."' The
justifications underlying such a usage are similar to those justifying
the use of the 'inherently governmental' test in the PMSC context-
private parties undertaking actions of the state should be held to the
same responsibilities as the state itself."" Thus, while the use of the
"inherently governmental" test suggested here would require a shift
in perspectives, it is not an unprecedented one.
So what then, does the test entail? Under 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(a),
"Contractors shall not be used for the performance of inherently
governmental functions. "' Four definitions of "inherently
governmental" functions can be found within United States law."'
The most widely accepted of these is the definition found in the
Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, which suggests that
"inherently governmental" means, "a function that is so intimately
related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal
Government employees."18' Specifically identified inherently
governmental activities include: the leadership of military personnel
176. See Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government
Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 425 (2006-2007).
177. Id at 429.
178. See Scalia's majority opinion in Lebron v. Nat'l Rail Passenger Corp., 513
U.S. 374, 397 (1995). For example of cases where private actors were deemed to be
undertaking public functions, see Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that
the conducting of elections is a public function); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (holding that a company performing public functions is subject to First
Amendment restrictions).
179. 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(a).
180. For more on inherently governmental functions under 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(a),
see generally Halchin et al., supra note 175.
181. FAIR Act, P.L. 105-270 §5(2) 112 Stat. 2382 (October 19, 1998) (codified at
31 U.S.C. § 501 note, at § 5(2)(A).
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who are members of the combat, combat support, or combat service
support role; 8 2 the conduct of foreign relations;" and the direction
and control of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations."
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), further
inherently governmental functions can be identified by looking for:
(1) the exercise of substantial discretionary authority by government
contractors, or (2) whether the contractors are making value
judgments on the government's behalf."'
In addition to what is prohibited by law, agencies are also
required to carefully consider contracting out functions "closely
associated with the performance of inherently governmental
functions," although they are not strictly prohibited from doing so."
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) lists nineteen functions
that approach being inherently government, including "Contractors
participating in any situation where it might be assumed that they are
agency employees or representatives" and "Contractors providing
special non-law enforcement, security activities that do not directly
involve criminal investigations, such as prisoner detention or
transport and non-military national security details."'
Most recently, in September 2011, the Obama administration
issued a final policy letter on inherently governmental functions.s
The final policy is meant to address the need for a "single consistent
definition" of inherently governmental functions that would better
ensure consistency amongst governmental agencies.8  In doing so,
182. 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(c)(3).
183. 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(c)(4).
184. 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(c)(8).
185. See, e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-242942 9
(Aug. 27, 1991).
186. Halchin et al, supra note 175, at 3.
187. 48 C.F.R. § (d)(13) & (19).
188. Office of Management and Budget: Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP), Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions (76 FR
56227 (Sept. 12, 2011)).
189. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Government Contracting,
Mar. 4, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ Memorandum
-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject-Government. This
memorandum specifically noted that "the line between inherently governmental
activities that should not be outsourced and commercial activities that may be subject
to private sector competition has been blurred and inadequately defined. As a result,
contractors may be performing inherently governmental functions. Agencies and
departments must operate under clear rules prescribing when outsourcing is and is
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the Obama administration definitively adopted the FAIR Act
definition, signaling its belief that actions intimately related to the
public interest impose unique considerations when outsourced to
private actors."l It further added additional examples to the list of
inherently governmental functions provided in FAR, including (1)
combat and (2) security operations in direct support of combat or
when there is a significant potential for combat. 9'
Given this broad definition, and the plethora of actions
committed by contractors that would appear to "approach being
inherently governmental," it is unsurprising that United States policy
has itself recognized that PMSCs often blur the line in engaging in
inherently governmental activity. Although the United States
government, and the DoD, has a strong incentive to avoid the
categorization of PMSCs as performing inherently governmental
functions, the reality of the situation suggests that there is clear
overlap. PMSCs have been documented in engaging in quick-
reaction force missions,'92 local patrolling,'93 and military convoy
security operations,94 all of which are situations where the DOD's
Office of General Counsel has acknowledged that it is inappropriate
to use PMSCs. 95 Often, PMSCs are so intertwined with regular
military personnel that PMSC contractors frequently protect United
States bases and engage in battles with insurgents, as well as
debriefing personnel, intelligence report writing, and interrogation of
detainees.'96 Given the centrality of war to the conceptualization of
the sovereign state, and the clear public interest in how war is
orchestrated, when PMSCs engage in functions parallel to the
military, they do engage in inherently governmental functions as
classified by United States law. Indeed, a review of Army commands
and headquarters undertaken by the Secretary of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Force Management, Manpower, and
Resources (FMMR) found 2,357 contractors performing inherently
not appropriate."
190. Halchin et al., supra note 175, at 5.
191. OFPP, supra note 188.
192. Halchin et al., supra note 175, at 12.
193. Id.
194. Id. (referencing Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel
Memorandum, Request to Contract for Private Security Companies in Iraq, Jan. 10,
2006).
195. Id.
196. SHEEHY, supra note 24, at 27.
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governmental functions, 45,934 contractors performing activities
closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and 1,877
contractors providing unauthorized personal services." While not all
PMSCs will cross this line, those that do should be held accountable
under this Article's proposed framework for international human
rights accountability.'"
3. The "Core Functions" Approach
Given the complexities and inconsistencies in the United States
use of the inherently governmental concept, several scholars have
proposed moving beyond it as a means of identifying those activities
closely connected to the state and focusing instead on identifying
those functions that, while not inherently governmental, are central to
the nation-state. They have been interchangeably termed "core
functions," "mission essential function," and "critical government
functions."'9 Laura Dickinson, a leading scholar on military affairs
and privatization, has explicitly suggested that the core competencies
notion better identifies those activities most in need of regulation,
and the idea has also been adopted by researchers at institutions such
as the Center for a New American Security.2 Much of the
197. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-11-192, Defense Acquisitions:
Further Action Needed to Better Implement Requirements for Conducting
Inventory of Service Contract Activities, 19 (2011).
198. Certainly, this analysis begs the question of why PMSCs are not simply held
accountable under these domestic laws, given the apparent violations. As discussed
in Part III.A, supra, United States domestic courts and domestic policy have been
quick to carve out exceptions and special circumstance for PMSCs. Even the
renewed efforts of the Obama administration have received significant pushback
from PMSCs and the DOD, and the interpretive nature of the tests and definitions
presented suggest some leeway for PMSCs to avoid accountability. Indeed, industry
officials, the DOD and the Department of State have all suggested that the suggested
policy would not substantially alter the DOD's use of private security contractors
during contingency operations, including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. See
Halchin et al., supra note 175, at 12. It is only under a framework that asserts full
accountability for PMSCs within the context of "inherently governmental" functions,
such as those also conducted by the military, that PMSCs can be fully prosecuted for
their crimes.
199. See Roger D. Carstens, Michael A. Cohen, & Maria Figueroa Kipqi,
Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting, New America Foundation (Oct.
2008), http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Changing-theCulture of_
Pentagon-Contracting.pdf, and Geoffrey Emeigh, Contracting Out: Law Professor
Suggests Focus on Core not Inherently Governmental Functions, 89 FED. CONT. REP.
649 (2008).
200. See Dr. John A. Nagl, The "Inherently Governmental" Conundrum,
Testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting (June 18, 2010); See also
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justification for considering core functions resides in the complex, and
often confusing, nature of the inherently governmental test described
above. From a purely practical perspective, agencies will more easily
and accurately determine those functions that only the government
should undertake if the nature of the test is more readily understood.
In this regard, "core functions" seem more explicit than the vague
categorization of that which is "inherently governmental," or so the
authors argue. Additionally, a core functions approach is believed to
be more flexible because it focuses on those functions the government
should develop, maintain, and enforce, rather than trying to
enumerate a list of specific activities that it is impermissible to
contract out.201  In times of war or crisis, the "core functions"
approach recognizes that a state may necessarily need to allow non-
state actors to undertake actions typically the responsibility of the
state.
However, because this approach is a relatively new concept,
there is little discussion as to what would constitute a core function
and the approach is hampered by criticisms that it is merely an
exercise in semantics that identifies virtually the same activities as
"inherently governmental" would.202 Among those seeking to lend
substance to the core functions approach, two potential principles
have developed for determining what activities might fall within the
category. The first argues that core functions are those activities that,
if removed, would lead to mission failure, and those that if performed
by contractors would pose significant legal complications.203 The
second suggests that core functions include those that require
fundamental skill sets.20
Although scholars seem hesitant to look outside the US domestic
context, guidance on a core function can also be found in
international jurisprudence on the subject of private actors and public
actions. For instance, under the United Kingdom's Human Rights
Act, entities that act as "functional public authorities" are required to
Laura Dickinson, An Uneasy Relationship U.S. Reliance on Private Security Firms in
Overseas Operations, Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs (Feb. 27, 2008).
201. Halchin et al., supra note 175, at 27.
202. John R. Luckey et al., Cong. Research Serv., R40641, Inherently
Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background,
Issues and Options for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 27 (2009).
203. CONTRACTING IN CONFLICTS, supra note 39, at n.106.
204. Id.
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comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, and to be
held accountable if they do not do so. 205 Like a core functions
approach, the jurisprudence within the UK courts focuses on what
constitutes a public function, and thereby creates a functional public
authority.2 06 Under current jurisprudence, a private entity is likely to
be found to be performing public functions if: (1) its structures and
work are closely linked with the delegating or contracting out State
body; (2) it is exercising powers of a public nature directly assigned to
it by statute; or (3) it is exercising coercive powers devolved from the
State.2" Although the courts have not yet considered the case of a
PMSC, or security firm more generally, they have found landlords,
housing associations, private providers of mental health care, and a
farmers' market association to be functional public authorities under
the act.208
Given the novelty of both of these approaches, it is not yet
suggested here that one is preferable to the other. Both have
theoretical limitations that will require further exploration. While the
inherently governmental approach is grounded in well-developed
policy, it suffers from the confusion and complexity that has
characterized various administrations' considerations of what can and
cannot be contracted. Conversely, the core functions approach, while
less marred by confusion, remains largely undefined. However, both
also suggest that given more extensive discussion, it is quite possible
to utilize existing legal constructs as a means of identifying those
PMSCs undertaking actions which should incur direct human rights
obligations.
B. Delineating Boundaries
Although the above tests allow for the determination of what
PMSCs can be conferred a limited legal personality, they do not
205. Human Rights Act of 1998, § 6(3)(b).
206. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE MEANING OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITY UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS Acr, 2003-2004, H.L. 39 H.C. 382 at 3
(U.K.).
207. Id. at 16.
208. See Aston Cantlow & Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v.
Wallbank, [2003] UKHL 37; Poplar Housing & Regeneration Cmty. Ass'n v.
Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595; Callin, Heather & Ward v. Leonard Cheshire
Found. [2002] EWCA Civ 366; R v. Hampshire Farmers' Market, ex parte Beer,
[2003] EWCA Civ 1056; London & Quadrant Housing Trust v. Weaver, R (On the
application of), [2009] EWCA Civ 587.
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elucidate the nature of the duties encompassed by that personality,
nor how far such obligations extend. The question of what duties are
included within PMSC's hypothesized responsibilities under
international law is important because one cannot simply rely on an
absolute transposition of state-centric international constructs onto
PMSCs, or non-state actors more broadly. Rather, the doctrine must
be tweaked slightly and reexamined to determine what rights and
obligations can be reasonably extended to PMSCs and how the
boundaries of those obligations can be conceptualized absent a clear
territorial circumscription.
1. What Rights?
Although there is an expeditious appeal to simply transferring
those rights and obligations held by the state to a non-state actor, a
closer examination of the breadth of these rights, and the sources of
authority from which they are derived, makes clear that the universe
of duties held by the state do not transpose neatly onto non-state
actors, particularly corporate entities. For example, civil liberties are
inherently the province of the state, such as the right to vote or right
to a fair trial." Conversely, basic human rights such as the right to
clean water or adequate housing might fall within the responsibility of
a PMSC under certain circumstances, but certainly are not implicitly
incorporated within a PMSC's legal personality. 210 Finally, there are
those rights, such as the right against the arbitrary deprivation of life,
which are arguably as nonderogable by a PMSC as they are by a state.
209. Other rights that are seen primarily as the obligation of the state include
immigration and citizenship rights, the right of a child to nationality, the right to vote
and run for office, and the right to marry. See International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights arts. 12(4), 23(2), 24, 25(b), 26, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
210. Steve Ratner conveys the nuance of these distinctions with his consideration
of how a private corporation might come to incur responsibilities for rights related to
the criminal process. He suggests that there are hypothetical situations, such as when
a company unfairly participates in a trial or tampers with evidence, that the company
has, to some extent, been involved in the deprivation of a fair trial. Under these
circumstances, he suggests that "the unique role for states in securing some rights
(such as the right to free counsel) does not preclude duties for corporations with
respect to other, related rights." Ratner, supra note 93, at 493. This is, essentially, an
argument for the continued consideration of corporate complicity in the violation of
those rights for whom duties can only be held by governments. Although this Article
will focus on the direct obligations of PMSCs, it by no means negates the possibility
of continued indirect liability via theories of complicity and aiding and abetting,
amongst others.
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Thus, any effort to extend human rights responsibilities beyond the
state must be careful not to create a set of duties that are overly
broad.
Because the duties of PMSCs do not duplicate those of the state,
a categorization of them requires international law to expand beyond
the state paradigm and consider how the roles of specific entities
implicate various human rights obligations. This does not necessitate
abandoning the structure of state duties all together; rather, it simply
requires a consideration of how the duties implied by a limited legal
personality can be better aligned with the current realities of
international relations. Given the link between a state's traditional
duties and the duties of a PMSC, this Article argues for a rights
determination that mirrors the reasoning applied to states, but
provides for an outcome of more limited scope. In other words, just as
the current human rights structures reflect a balance between the
rights of individuals and the functions and interests of the state (for
instance, with First Amendment jurisprudence),211 it seems only
logical that any regime governing human rights as they apply to
PMSCs would reflect a balance between these same rights of
individuals and the functions of "military necessity"212 that a PMSC
undertakes - what has been termed vertical balancing.213 Thus, just as
the military functions of the state are being ascribed to the PMSC, so
then are the traditional calculations of human rights obligations
within the limited context of national security and military action.
211. For example, identified interests of the states held to justifiably impede on
individual rights include national security, public order, public health, and the rights
and freedoms of others. See ICCPR, arts. 4, 12(3).
212. Although used more generally here, "military necessity" is defined within
international humanitarian law as providing an exception to general IHL provisions
under certain circumstances. It exempts military actors from ordinary IHL
obligations when (1) the measure is taken primarily for some specific military
purpose; (2) that measure is required for the attainment of that purpose; (3) that
purpose is in conformity with international humanitarian law, and (4) that measure
itself is otherwise in conformity with the law. The concept is representative of a form
of balancing that takes the exceptional circumstances of military need into account
when determining what conduct is or is not acceptable within the context of war. See
Nobuo Hayashi, Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian
Law and International Criminal Law, 28:39 B. U. IN'TL. L.J. 39, 41 (2010).
213. While most human rights duties will be approached under this balancing
framework, it is important to note that certain nonderogable rights clearly apply to
PMSCs with a force equal to that of states. See U.N. HRC, CCPR General Comment
29, States of Emergency (Article 4) at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11
(2001).
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While states may limit rights as necessary for the advancement of
society as a whole, PMSCs too can balance the rights of individuals
with specific military objectives. This may sound unappealingly but it
would be overtly disastrous to attempt to hold PMSCs accountable
for all human rights without due deference to the objectives they
advance and the unchartered territory of the norms being created.214
In addition to vertical balancing, a framework for human rights
accountability must also consider horizontal balancing, or the
balancing of individual rights with the rights of PMSCs themselves. If
PMSCs are to be held accountable for human rights violations and
prescribed obligations and duties under human rights law, they
certainly cannot then be denied rights themselves.215 Thus, in certain
contexts, the balancing issue to be considered would be not only the
interests of the PMSC, but also the PMSCs own rights under
international law. This balancing "is by its nature more difficult" but
is not altogether different from the current balancing of rights of
various private parties that occurs regularly within civil courts.216
So what rights then would appear to fall within the spectrum of
PMSC obligations? One can certainly begin with the most basic of
human rights obligations, jus cogens norms, for which it is often
argued that no derogation is permitted.217 While the obligations
encompassed within jus cogens are by no means definitively settled,
the International Law Commission has identified the most widely
accepted of these rights.218 These include "prohibitions against
aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against
humanity and torture and the right to self-determination." 219
214. Ratner, supra note 93, at 517. In line with this reasoning, Ratner suggests
that while it is fair to consider what rights non-state actors are obligated to recognize
and respect, it is not yet clear that the state responsibility for the promotion of human
rights is at all transferrable to the non-state actor context. Id.
215. The question of what rights PMSCs are then due is a discussion unto itself,
and one that will not be addressed in great detail here. For a consideration of this
concern, see generally Duruigbo, supra note 66.
216. Ratner, supra note 93, at 515.
217. Bellal et al., supra note 162, at 26-27. Jus Cogens means "compelling law."
Jus Cogens norms are defined as norms "accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character." Id.
218. See Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n (Vol. 2 Pt. 2) 31, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.17 (Part 2).
219. Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n (Vol. 2, Pt. II, Geneva (2001), at 85.
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Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has
identified the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment, taking hostages, imposing collective
punishments, and arbitrary deprivations of liberty as violations of jus
220
cogens norms.
However, such rights do not encompass the full array of
responsibilities that a limited legal personality imposes on PMSCs.
Although covering the gravest of offenses, they do not consider other
significant obligations espoused in international law, for instance,
those derived from the International Covenant on Economic and
Social Rights (ICESR) or from the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Thus, in addition to jus
cogens norms, the framework presented here relies on the suggested
balance between individual rights and military necessity for a full
exposition of the obligations PMSCs take on. Although never before
applied to the context of private military operators, this balance is not
an unfamiliar one and both state and international courts have
grappled with it extensively - most recently in the context of
terrorism.22' Perhaps unsurprisingly for those familiar with literature
on terrorism and human rights, there is a rather clear transatlantic
divide on the issue of how to construct such a balance.222 American
policy, for the most part, has resoundingly preferenced interests of
national security, while courts in Europe prefer to adhere to rule of
law and civil liberties.223 This may be due in part to the fact that
American courts strongly favor the application of national law over
international norms, while European jurisprudence emphasizes a
commitment to IHR.224 As such, this Article finds it most instructive
220. U.N. HRC, supra note 213, at 3, 5.
221. Within the United States, examples include Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 US 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). For a seminal case before the
European Court of Human Rights, see McCann and others v. United Kingdom, 21
Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 161, 150 (1995).
222. Lorenzo Zucca, A Transatlantic Divide on the Balance between Fundamental
Rights and Security, 32 B.C. INr'L & CoMp. L. REV. 231, 232 (2009).
223. Id. at 232.
224. The notable exception here is the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, where the court clearly articulated its belief that "the rule of law-
including international law-is not subservient to the will of the executive, even
during wartime." See David Cole, Why the Courts Said No, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug.
10, 2006), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/aug/10/why-the-court-said-
no/.
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to consider European jurisprudence as guidance for the balance of
interests between PMSCs and human rights, given that the concerns
addressed throughout this Article are of an inherently international
nature.
Given the intrinsic value of human rights, it might at first seem
clear that they should always win out in a balance against military or
national security interests. While this is appealing, even European
courts have acknowledged that the protection of national security and
military necessity implicates important human rights as well - life,
liberty, and economic prosperity are often intricately linked to the
preservation of security interests. Thus, the balance is not so
straightforward. PMSCs are, after all, contracted to provide military
and security support, which may occasionally lead to the use of deadly
force. The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms recognizes this, acknowledging
that deadly force is permissible, despite general provisions against the
deprivation of life, where only necessary force is used "in defence of
any person from unlawful violence" or for "deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war."225 However, as a general rule the European
Union has treated the rights of individuals with the utmost
importance, finding the military necessity of coercive interrogation
226 an n.2271 btactics, and unregulated wiretapping to be unjustifiable
transgressions of individual rights. Outside of the context of
terrorism, the ECHR has also held that when considering violations
of the individual rights to privacy, religion, expression, and assembly,
"a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed
... when determining whether State action is necessary in a
democratic society" and thus justified under the auspices of military
necessity.228
Finally, while certain basic considerations may be identified that
can impose obligations on PMSCs, it is important to note that as a
general rule, the determination of PMSC human rights duties will be
225. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
226. Ireland v. United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25.
227. Malone v. United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14.
228. William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The
European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16(4) EUR. J. INT'L L. 741, 766
(considering the case of McCann and Others v. United Kingdom App. No. 18984/91
EHCR (1995)).
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very situation-specific, based on the nature of the PMSC, the
activities they are undertaking, and the scope of their responsibilities.
Thus, it is impossible here to extrapolate on all the obligations that
can apply. Indeed, both international and domestic courts continue to
grapple with the extent and nature of duties imposed upon
governments, despite several centuries of jurisprudence, and similar
questions in the context of PMSCs are likely to be equally nuanced.
What the balancing test does provide for this framework for
accountability is a uniformity and parallelism with existing legal
reasoning - a means of addressing PMSC human rights obligations
that builds upon traditional statist constructions of international law
while at the same time expanding these constructions to consider the
intersections of individual rights and PMSC interests that increasingly
arise in our globalized world.
2. The Scope of Obligation
In addition to delineating the human rights that a PMSC can be
held responsible to protect and/or refrain from violating, an argument
for human rights norms to be made binding on PMSCs must also
determine what the "sphere of influence" for a PMSC is. In other
words, what are the outermost boundaries for a PMSC in terms of
actions and effects for which it can be held accountable? Does a
PMSC hold obligations only towards its employees? Or to the
broader community in which it works? This is, in essence, a question
of framing - a delineation of the boundaries of justice as they apply to
PMSCs.
This aspect of a normative human rights framework is rarely
questioned and existing entrenched frameworks often taken for
granted.229 For much of the past century, for example, the scope of
justice has been implicitly keyed towards statist frameworks, shaping
the sphere of influence to the territorial state and binding justice to
the obligations incurred amongst fellow citizens. In light of the
shifting global reality, and the identification of actors central to
international relations beyond the state, this territorial framing is now
in dispute. As one of the leading scholars on the subject comments,
"decisions taken in one territorial state often impact the lives of those
outside, as do the actions of transnational corporations, international
229. FRASER, supra note 95, at 2.
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currency speculators and large institutional investors."2 30 Even the
notion of territory itself is suspect - how does one determine the
territorial bounds of an entity that does not occupy traditional
political space? Quite clearly, notions of justice bounded by
territoriality and citizenship cannot easily be applied to private
entities such as PMSCs.
In response, new geographical scales of justice have emerged,
resulting in claims on behalf of varying groups of individuals, rather
than citizens alone.2 3' These competing claims are attempting to re-
frame not only the authority from which justice is requested, but also
the nature of justice they purport to request.2 32 Although the question
of what now constitutes justice has garnered the focus of most
scholars, for purposes of this Article, the central issue is
reconceptualizing the "who" in justice. The "who" of justice
encompasses both those entities one can legitimately seek justice
against and the nature of the actors who do the seeking.233 It is only
by reinterpreting this "who" that it can be expanded to incorporate
PMSCs and provide guidance on how justice applies to them.
The reason for this focus is that when understandings of justice in
international law do not properly capture the changing nature of the
"who" in globalized society, what results is what Frazer has termed a
"misframing"; individuals are excluded from "the right to have rights"
and marginalized from the true realities of political space. 23 Thus, for
instance, in the context of the invasion of Afghanistan, adherence to
outdated concepts of territorial justice channels the claims of most
Afghan citizens into a weak system of domestic courts and political
accountability, leaving outside actors, such as PMSCs, unaccountable
for the harms they have caused. Victims of their violent and
inhumane actions have no "right" to claim justice against them. The
result, more broadly, is a "gerrymandering" of international political
space, where transnational actors are immunized from accountability
230. Fraser, Reframing Justice in a Globalized World, in SCALES OF JUSTICE 12
(Nancy Fraser ed., 2009).
231. FRASER, supra note 95, at 2.
232. Id. at 3.
233. Thus, in the example of PMSCs, the "who" on one side must be expanded
beyond the State to include private entities. At the same time, the "who" that can
claim justice can no longer be the citizen as it is traditionally understood. So the
question then becomes - who counts as a member and what is the relevant
community? See id. at 15.
234. Id. at 20.
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by virtue of an international legal system that denies most individuals
claims to them." It is this misframing that Fraser suggests is the
"defining injustice of a globalizing age." '
In response to this dilemma, several transformative frameworks
have been suggested to frame a post-Westphalian concept of justice
that applies to actors beyond the state and which delineate the "who"
without reference to territoriality. The creation of such a framework
is ongoing, and many ideas have been characterized by both their
brief heyday and subsequent demise, such as broadened theories of
political membership and the humanist principle.237 It is important to
note that even here, a framework cannot be provided that ensures a
scope of obligations that is considerate of, and applicable to, all non-
state actors. In a post-nationalist era that embraces a multitude of
actors, the one-size-fits-all concept no longer works. Rather, in
considering PMSCs specifically, this Article suggests that the element
of misframing that insulates PMSC from accountability can be
remedied through the application of an "all-subjected" approach to
justice.
The all-subjected principle argues that all those jointly subject to
a given governance structure have legitimate claims for rights and
justice in relation to it."' This principle seeks to find an intermediary
ground between concepts of justice strictly related to the state and
loose systems of causal interdependence. Importantly, in keeping
with a framework of justice that transcends statist limitations,
governance must be understood broadly, relating to power of various
types, including the power of non-state actors to generate enforceable
rules that structure various parts of society.239 Similarly, to be
"subjected" means being subject to the coercive power of both non-
state and trans-state forms of governance.240 Thus, the all-subjected
framework for understanding the scope of the justiciable obligations
of PMSCs decouples justice from territoriality and instead promotes a
235. Id. at 21.
236. Id.
237. See Fraser, supra note 69.
238. Id. at 293.
239. FRASER, supra note 95, at 65. Frazer suggests that while the most obvious of
these non-state actors are agencies such as the World Trade Organization and the
International Monetary Fund, other examples include transnational agencies
governing a wide variety of subjects.
240. Fraser, supra note 69, at 293.
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focus on social relations of interdependence.241 To deserve
consideration within the all-subjected principle, one need not be an
official member of the structure doing the "governing," but must only
be subjected to its actions and regulations.24 This concept also
recognizes a plurality of justice structures, all with a variety of
potential subjects and overlapping spheres of influence. Finally, it
substantially reduces the negative implications of misframing by
structuring justice on the basis of one's interaction with an entity,
rather than marginalized concepts of citizenship and political
membership. In sum total, the all-subjected principle allows the law
to conceptualize rights and justice in a way that is in greater
alignment with international realities. As several scholars have
argued, the all-subjected principle, and its predecessor, the all-
affected principle,243 better protect democratic legitimacy by ensuring
that individuals truly have a say in the institutions that govern over
them. 244
Another way of considering this scope, and one that is perhaps
more illustrative, is to consider the all-subjected principle as
intertwined with notions of coercion. Within democratic theory, the
coercion principle dictates that all those subject to coercion should
241. FRASER, supra note 95, at 24. This does not, however, suggest a full
elimination of territoriality as a means of understanding and administering justice,
just as redefining legal personality does not abdicate the role of the state. Rather, in
both circumstances the coordination of the two can be guided by principles of
complimentarity, creating a system of accountability that is both broad-reaching and
tailored to the specific orientations of power at issue.
242. Id. at 66.
243. The all-affected principle says that all those persons whose interests are
affected by a state's laws and policies should have a say in their making. It was
argued "the principle of affected interests is very likely the best general principle of
inclusion that you are likely to find - everyone who is affected by the decisions of a
government should have the right to participate in that government." See Sarah
Song, Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights, 13(6) CITIZENSHIP STUD. 607, 609
(2009) (quoting ROBERT DAHL, AFrER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY IN A GOOD
SOCIETY 64-65 (2007)). Although originally embraced, the principle has faced
subsequent criticism for failing to delineate clear limits and falling prey to the
butterfly effect - that one can find evidence that just about everyone is affected by
just about everything. As Nancy Fraser argues, "Unable to identify morally relevant
social relations, it [the all-affected principle] treats every causal connection as equally
significant. Painting a night in which all cows are grey, it cannot resist the very one-
size-fits-all globalism it sought to avoid." Fraser, supra note 69, at 292 (emphasis in
the original).
244. See, e.g., Song, supra note 243. See generally IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC
JUSTICE (1999).
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have rights in relation to the coercive entity. Coercion is an
infringement on personal autonomy, and only through conferring
appropriate rights and obligations can such an infringement be
justified.245  As Sarah Song illustrates, coercion can range from
criminal punishment, to impositions on the right to property and
restrictions on movement and liberty. 246 Although traditionally
discussed in the context of the state, the concept is equally useful
here, and helps to illuminate the scope of obligations that PMSCs
undertake when guided by the all-subjected principle.
Translating this theory into practice, it is clear that violations
committed against employees would fall within the scope of company
responsibility. What is less clear is the extent to which, for instance
those living in communities affected by the PMSC would be
encompassed within the all-subjected principle. This determination
would likely depend on the nature of the relationship and the
intimacy between such communities and individuals, and the
inherently governmental attributes of the PMSC.247 It would ensure
that "those whose basic interests are most vitally affected by a
particular decision have the strongest claim to a say in its making."248
The most important factor would be the element of coercive power
present in the relationship - in the context of a community
"occupied" by a PMSC it is clear that a certain level of authority
arises.249 Where that authority is well established and coercive,
attributing a wider range of violations to the PMSC's acts would seem
to be appropriate.
V. Conclusion
In 1949, the International Court of Justice famously proclaimed
that the "subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily
identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their
nature depends upon the needs of the community." 25 0 In doing so, the
court hinted at the fact that concepts of international law are not
static. As international realities change, so too do concepts of justice,
245. Song, supra note 243, at 610.
246. Id.
247. Ratner, supra note 93, at 519.
248. SHAPIRO, supra note 244, at 37.
249. Ratner, supra note 93, at 520.
250. Reparations Case, supra note 1, at 178.
2012]1 87
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
rights, and obligations. This Article has sought to expound upon one
of these changes-the introduction of new and powerful non-state
actors to geopolitics and their prevalence within the realm of national
security and warfare. These actors have fundamentally altered the
nature of war, and have turned an endeavor once foundational to the
state into a multifaceted and complex marketplace for violence. The
accountability gaps that have resulted from such changes have equally
important implications for the regulation of military activity, and
threaten to create a culture of tacit acceptance for human rights
violations. This Article puts forth a novel remedy for such problems,
the establishment of a theoretical framework for the direct
application of human rights norms to private military security firms.
This theoretical framework, although perhaps controversial, is
grounded in concepts well rooted in international law and
international relations. It draws upon recent scholarly precedents to
suggest that the identification of legal personality sufficient to
establish liability can be extended, in limited circumstances, to non-
governmental entities such as PMSCs. It further proposes that the
potential for such liability is predicated on the nature of the PMSC's
actions, and their degree of relation to governmental functions -
under an "inherently governmental" or "core functions" approach.
Finally, it recognizes that any plausible framework must impose
necessary boundaries on the extent of liability, including delineating
the nature of the rights to be protected and the scope of a PMSC's
potential obligations in relation to those rights. The framework
proposed here maintains that those rights to be protected must be
identified through a careful balancing of the established rights of
individuals and the functions of military necessity that a PMSC
undertakes, and that the obligation to protect such rights must extend
to all those "subjected" to the coercive power of the PMSC and its
actions.
This framework represents an important first step in
conceptualizing an alternative theoretical regulatory framework for
more directly addressing the [a]ccountability gap in which PMSCs
reside. It does not, and cannot, attempt to address all possible
implementation and enforcement concerns. It is readily
acknowledged that a complete institutional structure for the
enforcement of international human rights obligations against non-
state entities has not yet been developed. Such challenges should not,
however, preclude consideration of what a theoretical framework for
expanded human rights obligations can, and should, look like. Within
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the context of globalization and global justice, the presentation of
normative advances frequently involves the articulation of legal
norms without the literal power to enforce them.25 1 Indeed, law holds
both a coercive and an imaginative power.25 2 It can act as a coercive
command against undesirable actions, lending legitimacy to a political
order and a rule of law. At the same time, expanded
conceptualizations of law, theorized but not yet realized are also a
"language for imagining alternative future worlds" and an important
aspect of societal advancement.
While it is clearly hoped that the efforts of this Article will one
day be utilized to ensure practical remedies for the [a]ccountability
gap presented here, that is not its only contribution. The framework
presented here is but one of many means of imagining a world where
international law acts in greater alignment with international reality,
and where normative and discursive efforts to address the larger
[A]ccountability gap take place. The problems of outdated statist
orientations and fundamental misalignments need not, and should
not, wait for the establishment of a global institutional structure
before they are discussed. Rather, the project of international norm
development, especially as it pertains to PMSCs, must begin now.
This Article hopes to have made a meaningful contribution in
furtherance of that discussion.
251. Berman, supra note 67, at 533.
252. Id. at 534.
253. Id.
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